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LONG ON RHETORIC, SHORT ON RESULTS: 
AGILE METHODS AND CYBER ACQUISITIONS IN 
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
Major Daniel E. Schoeni, USAF† 
What is of the greatest importance in war is speed.1 
— Sun Tzu 
 
Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics.2 
— General Robert H. Barrow, USMC 
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INTRODUCTION 
Cyber warfare has arrived. The Department of Defense (DoD) is 
under attack, and our security is at stake. Yet in a field defined by its 
rapid growth, the DoD arms itself at the same pace that that it buys 
major weapons systems, an acquisition cycle of 7–10 years. It thus buys 
obsolete cyber-defense tools. The “arsenal of democracy”3 has already 
provided us the tools for overcoming this impediment in the form of 
agile software-development methods. Yet the DoD has been reluctant 
to set aside decades of experience and utilize different methods for 
software than it does for other acquisitions. But unless it does so, it may 
well lose its edge, and not only in the cyber domain. 
The next four sections will proceed as follows. The first describes 
the growing threat of cyberattacks generally, discusses how they affect 
the DoD and our security specifically, and then explains the 
relationship between DoD cybersecurity and rapid-cyber 
procurement.4 The second summarizes agile software development—
 
 3. Though it was FDR who made this phrase famous in his eponymous speech on 
December 29, 1940, it was industrialist Bill Knudson who coined the term. After a successful 
career at Ford and GM, Knudson was chosen to head up the National Defense Advisory Council, 
the group charged with retooling America’s peacetime economy for war. See ARTHUR HERMAN, 
FREEDOM’S FORGE: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESS PRODUCED VICTORY DURING WW II 69–71, 115, 
129 (2012). 
 4. This paper is not the first to suggest the connection between cybersecurity and 
acquisition practices. In fact, on January 23, 2014, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and Daniel 
M. Tangherlini of the General Services Administration wrote a memorandum to the assistants to 
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its history, methods, and track record. The third recounts the history of 
federal and DoD IT acquisitions and the DoD’s attempt at agile 
reforms. Though underway for a decade or more, there is little to show 
for it. The last section focuses on the analysis of why agile has not taken 
root, how to foster such reforms in the DoD, and benefits that may 
accrue. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This section first considers cyberspace dangers generally, then the 
unique threat to the DoD, and finally problems with its acquisitions 
practices. After discussing these dangers and the DoD’s 
unpreparedness in this domain, the next section turns to the agile 
method as alternative to the current software-development model. 
To avoid any confusion, it bears mentioning that this paper uses 
the terms cyber, software, and information technology (IT) almost 
interchangeably—the first as an adjective, and the latter two as nouns 
for the same concept.  Although both the introduction and background 
that follows concentrate on cybersecurity, concerns about software 
development and acquisition practices apply more broadly. Because the 
DoD relies on software for more than cyberattack and defense,5 its 
acquisition practices are of wider concern. Thus, while there are 
admittedly differences between cyber, software, and IT,6 they are 
related terms and this paper will not dwell on their distinctions. 
 
the president for homeland security and economic affairs forwarding a study on this subject. 
IMPROVING CYBERSECURITY AND RESILIENCE THROUGH ACQUISITION: FINAL REPORT OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, S.C493D22 (2013). 
 5. See infra note 25. 
 6. The OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE reports that “cyber” is an adjective that 
first came into use in 1992 meaning “of, relating to, or involving (the culture of) computers, virtual 
reality, and or the Internet.” Cyber Definition, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY ONLINE, http:// 
www.oed.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/view/Entry/250878?rskey=V6b5Z3&result=1#eid (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2014). It reports that “information technology” is a noun and relatively older term coming 
into use in 1952 referring to the “branch of technology concerned with the dissemination, 
processing, and storage of information, esp. by means of computers.” Information Technology 
Definition, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.oed.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/view 
/Entry/273052?redirectedFrom=information+technology#eid (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). And it 
reports that “software” came into use almost a decade later (1960) and signifies the “programs 
and procedures required to enable a computer to perform a specific task, as opposed to the physical 
components of the system.” Software Definition, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY ONLINE, http:// 
www.oed.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/view/Entry/183938?redirectedFrom=software#eid (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2014). There are some obvious distinctions among the terms. For example, IT and software 
have overlapping but not coextensive definitions; the former encompasses not only software but 
also hardware, the latter only software. Further, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) has its 
own definitions for these terms that differ in some respects from the common usage. See, e.g., 
FAR 2.101 (making a distinction between the term “computer software,” which means, “programs 
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A. Hackers, Cyberattacks, and the Need for Cybersecurity 
The fight for security, in both private and public sectors, is part of 
what Michael Gross calls “World War 3.0” in his eponymous Vanity 
Fair article.7 He explains that the Web’s openness makes users 
vulnerable to “various kinds of hacking, including corporate and 
government espionage, personal surveillance, the hijacking of Web 
traffic, and remote manipulation of computer-controlled military and 
industrial processes.”8  
Consistent with Gross’s account, reports of cybercrime,9 large 
companies being hacked,10 and cyberattacks on government agencies11 
 
that comprise a series of instructions, rules, routines, or statements, regardless of the media in 
which recorded, that allow or cause a computer to perform a specific operation or series of 
operations” and the term “computer data bases”); see also JAMES G. MCEWEN, DAVID S. BLOCH, 
RICHARD M. GRAY & JOHN T. LUCAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS: 
PROTECTING AND ENFORCING IP AT THE STATE AND FEDERAL LEVEL 76–83 (2d ed. 2012) 
(explaining the definitions of computer software and related terms under the FAR and DFARS). 
 7. Michael Gross, World War 3.0, VANITY FAIR (May 2012), http://www.vanityfair.com 
/news/2012/05/internet-regulation-war-sopa-pipa-defcon-hacking. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Harris et al., Sneaky Path Into Target Customers’ Wallets, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2014, at A1 (describing Eastern European hackers’ $18 billion theft from 
consumers using debit cards at Target); The Digital Arms Trade, ECONOMIST (Mar. 30, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21574478-market-software-helps-hackers-penetrate 
-computer-systems-digital-arms-trade/ (describing the market of selling software “exploits” to 
organized crime and terror groups); Richard A. Clarke, Stop Ignoring Online Thieves, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 8, 2013, at A17 (claiming cybercrime is a multi-billion dollar industry); Misha Glenny, 
MCMAFIA: A JOURNEY THROUGH THE GLOBAL CRIMINAL UNDERWORLD 264–86 (2008) 
(detailing Brazilian mafia’s cybercrime connections with Russia). 
 10. See, e.g., Hayley Tsukayama, Apple Hit by Hackers who Attacked Facebook, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 20, 2013, at A12 (explaining that hackers attacked both companies exploiting a 
backdoor in Oracle’s Java program to insert malware); Nicole Perlroth, American Banks’ Sites 
Are Attacked By Hackers, N.Y. TIMES Jan. 5, 2013, at B2 (describing attacks on Bank of America, 
Citigroup, U.S. Bank, Wells Fargo, and PNC by al-Qassam group “in retaliation for an anti-Islam 
video”); David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, Cyberattacks on the Rise Against U.S. Corporations, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2013, at A6 (warning of new attacks against businesses coming from the 
Middle East seeking to interfere with industrial machinery); U.S.-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission Report, CQ CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY, Nov. 20, 2013 (citing U.S. Cyber 
Command estimate that U.S. companies lose $250 billion annually to espionage); Nathaniel 
Popper, Wall Street’s Exposure To Hacking Laid Bare, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2013, at B1 (detailing 
indictment of two hackers who gained access to NASDAQ for two years); see also Danny Palmer, 
A Third of SMBs Unaware They’ve Been Cyber Attack Victims, COMPUTING (Nov. 19, 2013), 
http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2307942/a-third-of-smbs-unaware-theyve-been-cyber 
-attack-victims (reporting that small businesses are under attack, but often lack the resources to 
know it); CLINT WITCHALLS, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, INFORMATION RISK: MANAGING 
DIGITAL ASSETS IN A NEW TECHNOLOGY LANDSCAPE 10 (James Chambers ed., 2013), available 
at http://www.economistinsights.com/technology-innovation/analysis/information-risk (reporting 
that small businesses are sometimes special targets of cyberattacks). 
 11. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-661T, CYBER THREATS AND 
VULNERABILITIES PLACE FEDERAL SYSTEMS AT RISK (2009) (summary of Congressional 
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have become so common that they barely register.12 Yet, though we 
may be inured, our networks are not, and our economy and way of life 
have come to depend on the Internet. 
These threats come from a variety of sources including state 
actors, organized crime, and assorted anarchists. At present, state actors 
are most sophisticated,13 with organized crime close at heel.14 Yet while 
anarchist groups’ skills were once modest, or at least not widely 
 
testimony); Australia Police, Central Bank Websites Hacked, PHYS ORG (Nov. 21, 2013), 
http://phys.org/news/2013-11-australia-police-central-bank-websites.html; Steven Stalinsky, 
China Isn’t the Only Source of Cyberattacks, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2013, at A17 (reporting that 
Tunisian Cyber Army and al-Qaeda Electronic Army hacked the DoD, State Department, and 
Department of Homeland Security); William Wan & Ellen Nakashima, Chinese Cyberspying Hits 
More Than 140 Targets, Report Says, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2013, at A08 (citing Mandiant report 
indicating that a dozen agencies had been infiltrated); Lisa Rein, Virus Infects Computers at 
Commerce Dept. Agency, WASH. POST (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics 
/commerce-agencys-system-infected-by-virus-may-be-victim-of-cyber-attack/2012/02/02/gIQA 
ViHWlQ_story.html (describing attack that forced the Department of Commerce to shut down 
internet access for 10 days); Paul Elias, Federal Agencies Pursue Anonymous, WASH. POST, Sep. 
12, 2011, at A23 (reporting that LulzSec, an Anonymous affiliate, hacked the CIA’s website); 
William J. Lynn III, Defending a New Domain Subtitle: The Pentagon’s Cyberstrategy, 89 
FOREIGN AFF. 97 (2010) (confirming a successfully attack on U.S. Central Command in 2008 
using infected flash drives, previous reports suggested Russia was to blame); John Markoff, China 
Link Suspected In Hacking Of Arms LabFolder, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2007, at A40 (reporting that 
the Chinese hacked into the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee where nuclear weapons 
research is conducted). Moreover, this threat not only affects the federal government, but also 
affects states and local government. See, e.g., John Stephenson & Karla Jones, Fighting Cyber 
Warfare at the State Level, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2013, at A11 (describing numerous threats 
including “hackers breaking into power grids, communications networks and other critical 
systems, wreaking havoc by rendering these systems useless during an emergency”). 
 12. Common as reports are, they likely underreport the frequency of attacks. Businesses 
are secretive about when they have been hacked as “publishing specific details about hacks will 
highlight weak spots, or at least point to where most attention or resources are being deployed,” 
and “even talking about cyber-attacks can attract more attention from cyber-attackers.” James 
Chambers, Cracking the Code of Silence, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT (Nov. 20, 2013), 
http://www.economistinsights.com/technology-innovation/opinion/code-silence. 
 13. See, e.g., BRANDON VALERIANO & RYAN C. MANESS, CYBER WAR VERSUS CYBER 
REALITIES: CYBER CONFLICT IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 25 (2015) (explaining that large 
state actors “seem to be the most dominant cyber actors because they have the resources, 
manpower, and money to support massive cyber operations”). 
 14. See, e.g., Caroline Fairchild, Target Security Breach Likely to Be ‘Highly Sophisticated 
Organized Crime,’ FORTUNE (Dec. 13, 2013), http://fortune.com/2013/12/19/tar get-security 
-breach-likely-to-be-highly-sophisticated-organized-crime/ (reporting that organized crime’s 
hacking skills are increasingly sophisticated); Steve Ranger, Organized Cybercrime Groups Are 
now as Powerful as Nations, ZDNET, Jun. 9, 2014, http://www.zdnet.com/article/organised-cyber 
crime-groups-are-now-as-powerful-as-nations/ (describing the proliferation of cybercrime as 
“hackers share skills to build complex attacks to steal cash and intellectual property”); Cyber 
Security: Protecting America’s New Frontier, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism 
& Homeland Security, 121st Cong. 5 (2011) (warning that “cyber crime on the rise with criminal 
syndicates operating with increasing sophistication”). 
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distributed among their ranks,15 their sophistication increases daily and 
poses a growing cause for concern.16  
Perhaps the best indicator of how serious all of this has become is 
that government is not alone in the effort to steel itself against the 
growing threat.17 The private sector has likewise taken notice. 
Cybersecurity has become a multi-billion dollar industry.18 Firms have 
started buying cyber insurance.19 And some advocate for their right to 
“hack back” when they are attacked.20 Some commentators argue the 
private sector nevertheless underestimates the dangers and spends less 
than it should on cyber self-defense.21 In any event, the private sector’s 
growing awareness of, and efforts to protect itself from, cyberattacks 
suggest that cybersecurity risks are as ubiquitous as they are real.22 
 
 15. See PARMY OLSON, WE ARE ANONYMOUS 36–37, 80 (2012) (describing methods of 
early attacks by Anonymous members as effective yet technically unsophisticated and their 
evolution since then). 
 16. See Jim Finkle & Joseph Minn, Exclusive: FBI Warns of U.S. Government Breaches by 
Anonymous Hackers, REUTERS (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/15/us 
-usa-security-anonymous-fbi-idUSBRE9AE17C20131115 (giving Anonymous credit for 
exploiting flaws in Adobe software to hack into “U.S. Army, Department of Energy, Department 
of Health and Human Services, and perhaps many more agencies”). 
 17. See, e.g., Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 
Fed. Reg. 11739 (Feb. 12, 2013) (explaining that the “cyber threat to critical infrastructure 
continues to grow and represents one of the most serious national security challenges”). 
 18. Press Release, Gartner Says Worldwide Security Market to Grow 8.7 Percent in 2013, 
(June 11, 2013), http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2512215 (announcing that cybersecurity 
would reach an estimated $67.2 billion in 2013 and projecting $86 billion in 2016); see also 
ECONOMIST, Cyber-Security: White Hats To The Rescue, Feb. 22, 2014, at 55–56 (describing a 
growing market for “white hat” hackers to do penetration tests to identify cybersecurity 
weaknesses). 
 19. See James Willhite, On Alert Against Cybercrime—More CFOs Weigh Insurance 
Against Data Breaches, Despite Limits on Coverage, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2013, at B6 (citing a 
survey showing that 31% of firms buy business insurance largely due to cybersecurity threats). 
But see STEPHEN E. FLYNN & DANIEL B. PRIETO, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CSR NO. 13, 
NEGLECTED DEFENSE: MOBILIZING THE PRIVATE SECTOR TO SUPPORT HOMELAND SECURITY 23–
24 (2006), available at http://www.cfr.org/border-and-port-security/neglected-defense/p10457 
(arguing that cybersecurity insurance won’t take off without government engagement). 
 20. Christopher M. Matthews, Cybertheft Victims Itchy to Retaliate, WALL ST. J., June 3, 
2013, at B6 (describing the business community’s growing support for responding to hackers in 
kind)); James Podgers, Should Hacked Firms Be Cybercops?, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 1, 2013), http:// 
www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/should_hacked_firms_be_cybercops/ (recounting a panel 
on active cyber defense and referencing ABA’s ongoing work in this area); PAUL ROSENZWEIG, 
CYBER WARFARE: HOW CONFLICTS IN CYBERSPACE ARE CHALLENGING AMERICA AND 
CHANGING THE WORLD 69 (2013) (noting the possibility of issuing letters of marque and reprisal 
to private companies under the U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 11). 
 21. See, e.g., id. 157–65 (providing an economic rationale for the private market’s 
underspending on cybersecurity given the high level of threat posed). 
 22. One need look no farther than one’s own wallet to see evidence of the private sector’s 
growing efforts to protect consumers from mounting cybersecurity threats. Following last year’s 
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B. Cyberattacks on the DoD and National Security. 
Far from being immune to the increasing risks just described, the 
DoD faces even greater cyber threats because it is such an attractive 
target.23 That is not only due to its dominance, but also because it is so 
dependent on IT.24 To illustrate, 90% of weapons systems’ functionality 
relies on software.25 So cyber warfare tempts our “adversaries because 
it poses a significant risk at low cost.”26 Indeed, such adversaries scan 
DoD networks millions of times a day searching for weaknesses, and 
weaknesses they have found, thereby pilfering blueprints to some of 
our most advanced weapons.27 This is no longer the stuff of science 
fiction or far-fetched airport spy thrillers. High-stakes cyber espionage 
has arrived. 
The DoD recognizes the threats, and has instituted plans for 
preventing, defending from, and mitigating them.28 It has also taken 
some steps to shore up the security of the industrial base,29 which not 
only houses state-of-the-art weapons designs but has proven quite 
 
attack on Target, see Harris et al., supra note 9, U.S. banks have announced they will adopt cards 
with embedded chips affording better security. Joe Nocera, Dogged by Data Theft, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 11, 2014, at A27 (describing the efforts to adopt the European-style “chip-and-PIN” card that 
both “encrypts data and authenticates the card”). 
 23. DAVI D’AGOSTINO & GREG WILSHUSEN, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-
11-75, DEFENSE DEPARTMENT CYBER EFFORTS: DOD FACES CHALLENGES IN ITS CYBER 
ACTIVITIES 1–2 (2011). 
 24. Id. (noting that although the DoD operates 7 million computers and 10,000 networks it 
failed to appreciate the danger until its inept response to a malware attack in 2008 “exposed the 
weakness of the DoD’s command and control authorities . . . for cyberspace operations”). 
 25. REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR THE ACQUISITION OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 6 (2009) 
(explaining that software accounted for only 20% of weapons’ functionality in 1970, increased to 
80% in 2000, and now accounts for 90%) (citing DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON 
DEFENSE SOFTWARE (2000); PROGRAM MANAGER’S GUIDE FOR MANAGING SOFTWARE (2001)); 
see also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CRITICAL CODE: SOFTWARE PRODUCIBILITY FOR THE 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 17–19 (2010) (explaining that software “is increasingly used to 
embody the functionality of defense systems of all kinds” and “at the core of the ability to achieve 
integration and maintain agility” of the use of technology as “force multiplier”); Barry Boehm, 
Richard Turner, & Peter Kind, Risky Business: Seven Myths About Software Engineering That 
Impact Defense Acquisitions, 31 PROGRAM MANAGER (2002) (quoting an Air Force General 
saying, “About the only thing you can do with an F-22 without software is take a picture of it.”). 
 26. D’AGOSTINO & WILSHUSEN, supra note 23, at 1–2. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW 37–39 (2010) (“Operating Successfully in 
Cyberspace”). 
 29. See, e.g., Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) Safeguarding 
Unclassified Controlled Technical Information, 78 Fed. Reg. 69273 (final rule issued Nov. 18, 
2013) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. parts 204, 212, 252) (adding DFARS clause requiring defense 
contractors to report to the DoD when sensitive information has been compromised, e.g., cyber 
espionage). 
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vulnerable to espionage.30 One expert testified that the Chinese have 
stolen plans for the F-35 from Lockheed-Martin, Northrop-Grumman, 
and BAE,31 and another 50 weapons systems, including Patriot and 
Aegis missile defense systems, V-22 Osprey, F/A-18 fighter, and 
Littoral Combat Ship have also been stolen.32 That is to list only 
examples of espionage, while the DoD faces a wider range of threats.33 
Collectively, “such threats,” James Clapper, the Director of National 
Intelligence, has said, “pose a critical national and economic security 
concern.”34 Federal acquisition policy and practice play an important 
role in addressing these threats.35  
 
 30. See, e.g., MANDIANT, APT1: EXPOSING THE THREAT OF ONE OF CHINA’S CYBER 
ESPIONAGE UNITS (2012) (uncovering cyber espionage against 151 U.S. companies committed 
over seven years); Danny Yadron, Chinese Hacked U.S. Military Contractors, WALL ST. J. 
ONLINE (Sept. 18, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/chinese-hacked-u-s-military-contractors-
senate-panel-says1410968094?mod=WSJ_hps_sections_news (writing that Chinese hackers have 
broken into computer networks of private transportation companies working for the U.S. military 
20 times in the past year); see also DFARS Safeguarding Unclassified Controlled Technical 
Information, 78 Fed. Reg. 69273 (Nov. 18, 2013) (codified as 48 C.F.R. Parts 204, 212, 252) 
(adding clause to safeguard information held by defense contractors). 
 31. CYBER ESPIONAGE AND THE THEFT OF U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
TECHNOLOGY (2013) (testimony of Dr. Larry M. Wortzel, Strategic Studies Institute), 
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF02/20130709/101104/HHRG-113-IF02-Wstate-WortzelL-
20130709-U1.pdf. 
 32. Id. (citing Ellen Nakashima, Confidential Report Lists U.S. Weapons System Designs 




 33. For example, fighter jets make attractive targets for hackers because of “their reliance 
on software and information technology,” and controlling the software is to control the hardware. 
See Brendan McGarry, Is the F-35’s Computer R2-D2 or HAL?, DEFENSETECH (Feb. 19, 2014), 
http://defensetech.org/2014/02/19/is-the-f-35s-computer-r2-d2-or-hal/ (citing David Martin, Is 
the F-35 Worth It?, 60 MINUTES (Feb. 15, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/f-35-joint-strike-
fighter-60-minutes/; Can the U.S. Military’s New Jet Fighter Be Hacked?, 60 MINUTES OVERTIME 
(Feb. 16, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/can-the-f-35-be-hacked/ (describing the risk of 
cyberattacks on “ALIS,” the F-35 fighter jet’s onboard computer). The author is indebted to 
Steven Schooner for alerting him of this report. 
 34. GREGORY C. WILHUSEN, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE GAO-12-666T, 
CYBERSECURITY: THREATS IMPACTING THE NATION 1 (2012) (summary of Congressional 
testimony) (citing JAMES L. CLAPPER, UNCLASSIFIED STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD ON THE 
WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FOR THE SENATE 
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (2012)).  
 35. See IMPROVING CYBERSECURITY AND RESILIENCE THROUGH ACQUISITION, supra note 
4 (making recommendations to the president on the “feasibility, security benefits, and relative 
merits of incorporating security standards into acquisition planning and contract administration”). 
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C. The DoD and Cyber Acquisitions 
In 1965, Intel’s founder Gordon Moore famously predicted that 
computer processing power would double every year,36 later revising 
that prediction to two years.37 His prediction has held true for the last 
five decades, and we have seen exponential growth rates in various 
measures of technological growth, including processing speed, 
memory capacity, and digital camera pixels.38 Such rapid growth is 
significant for our increasingly cyber-dependent military, which relies 
not only on instantaneous worldwide communication but also on 
military hardware whose functionality heavily depends on software.39 
“In short,” wrote the Defense Science Board, “more software, means 
more vulnerability.”40 
This weakness is not lost on our adversaries.41 It is compounded 
by the DoD’s longstanding problem with slow IT acquisition, which 
the Obama-Biden transition team in 2009 aptly called “fundamentally 
broken.”42 While cyberattacks happen in mere seconds,43 IT acquisition 
is measured in months and years.44 With a few exceptions discussed 
later, the DoD purchases software like major weapons systems,45 and 
 
 36. See Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits, 38 
ELECTRONICS MAG. (Apr. 19, 1965). 
 37. See Gordon E. Moore, Progress in Digital Integrated Electronics, 21 IEDM TECH. 
DIGEST 11, 11–13 (1975), available at http://www.lithoguru.com/scientist/CHE323/Moore 
1975.pdf. 
 38. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, MEASURING AND SUSTAINING THE NEW ECONOMY: 
ENHANCING PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN THE INFORMATION AGE 6 (Dale W. Jorgenson & Charles 
W. Wessner eds., 2006). Though “processing speed is no longer increasing at this rate,” DEFENSE 
SCIENCE BOARD REPORT supra note 25 at 7, quantum computers may soon overcome this barrier. 
See, e.g., Quentin Hardy, A Big Leap To Quantum Computing, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2013, at B11. 
 39. DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 25, at 6 (explaining software currently 
provides 90% or more of a weapon’s system’s functionality). 
 40. Id. at 17. 
 41. See id. 
 42. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE ACQUISITION OF 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 28–29 (2010). 
 43. Id. at 23 (explaining that “cyber attacks on IT systems used to be lengthy, planned-out 
attacks, but now automated scanning, analysis, and global sharing of attack vectors enable attack 
cycles to occur in minutes and sometimes seconds”). 
 44. Id. (explaining the “overall portfolio of DOD IT programs has experienced a 21-month 
delay in delivering initial operational capability to the war fighter, and 14 percent are more than 
four years late”) (citing KATHERINE V. SCHINASI, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-
08-782T, DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: BETTER WEAPON PROGRAM OUTCOMES REQUIRE DISCIPLINE, 
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN THE ACQUISITION ENVIRONMENT 5 (2008) 
(Congressional testimony)).  
 45. Many have argued that the process does not work well for major weapons systems 
either. See, e.g., Secretary Robert M. Gates, A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon 
for a New Age, FOREIGN AFF. (May/June 2009) (arguing that the Pentagon’s acquisition system 
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this is a process that can take 7–10 years from planning to delivery.46 
That the rest of the government has similar problems is of only small 
consolation,47 as these are not only life and death matters for the 
individual warfighter, but also bear on our military readiness and 
national security more generally. In short, defending from cyberattacks 
and developing state-of-the-art cyber weapons depend on acquisition 
that moves on par with the pace of technological growth. Though the 
DoD far outspends its strategic rivals,48 volume will be to no avail if its 
weapons are already obsolete when fielded.49 And as important as 
superior technology can be to warfare,50 it can be fleeting51—all the 
more so if our acquisitions move at a much slower pace than that at 
which technology changes. 
 
is “baroque” and that deployed warfighters need solutions that can be fielded in months and weeks 
rather than in years); MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-
1159T, DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES ARE NEEDED TO IMPROVE WEAPON 
PROGRAM OUTCOMES 1–3 (2008) (testifying that “continue to take longer, cost more, and deliver 
fewer quantities and capabilities than originally planned” despite GAO warnings since 1990).  
 46. Colin Clark, Army Cyber Chief Meets Buyers In Pursuit Of Faster Acquisition, 
BREAKING DEFENSE (Oct. 22, 2013), http://breakingdefense.com/2013/10/army-cyber-chief 
-meets-buyers-in-pursuit-of-faster-acquisition/. 
 47. See, e.g., Clay Johnson & Harper Reed, Op-Ed, Why the Government Never Gets Tech 
Right, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2013, available at http://nyti.ms/1DWmXtK (reporting that in the last 
10 years more than half of all large federal IT programs have been delayed and 41% have failed 
users’ expectations); Katherine M. John, Information Technology Procurement in the United 
States and Canada: Reflecting on the Past with an Eye Toward the Future, 48 PROCUREMENT 
LAWYER 4, 5 (2013) (noting “a recurrent criticism of federal government IT is that it fails to keep 
pace with private sector advancements”); Steven Brill, Code Red, TIME, Mar. 10, 2014, at 26 
(recounting the story of the private sector experts who rescued the HealthCare.gov Website).  
 48. See, e.g., THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, THE MILITARY 
BALANCE 548–54 (2013) (providing tables illustrating that the United States’ disproportionate 
defense spending compared with other nations); David Wessel, Everything You Ever Wanted To 
Know About The Budget But Were Afraid to Ask, WALL ST. J., Jul. 12, 2012, at C3 (reporting that 
the “U.S. defense budget is greater than the combined defense budgets of the next 17 largest 
spenders”). 
 49. Further, money cannot buy timely software delivery. Counterintuitively, Brooks’s Law 
says assigning more manpower to a troubled software project can actually slow down 
development. See FRED BROOKS, THE MYTHICAL MAN MONTH: ESSAYS ON SOFTWARE 
ENGINEERING 25, 274 (1975).  
 50. See infra note 56 (describing the distinct advantages of superior technology in warfare). 
 51. P.W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS REVOLUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE 
21ST CENTURY 238–41 (2009) (warning about the risk of complacency about superior American 
technology). 
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Military and political leaders recognize that this must change.52 
Several studies have reached this conclusion,53 and the Defense Science 
Board warned: 
The deliberate process through which weapon systems and 
information technology are acquired by DOD cannot keep pace with 
the speed at which new capabilities are being introduced in today’s 
information age—and the speed with which potential adversaries 
can procure, adapt, and employ those same capabilities against the 
United States.54 
The DoD recently concluded that rapid IT-acquisition processes are 
“vital to national security” and is adjusting its policies and strategies 
accordingly.55 Later sections will consider how effective those efforts 
have been, explain why they have largely failed to deliver, and offer 
 
 52. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 46 (Army’s top cyber commander saying “he wanted to buy 
‘faster, better, quicker’ since the cyber realm doesn’t really allow for the seven to 10 years a 
standard acquisition program usually takes.”); Ellen Nakashima, Pentagon to Fast-Track 
Cyberweapons Acquisition, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2012, at A3 (reporting that Pentagon officials 
recognize that sometimes “risk to operations and personnel” caused by slow cyber acquisitions 
“is unacceptable”); Amber Corin, Navy: Faster Acquisition Key to Cyber Defense, FCW (June 28, 
2011), http://fcw.com/articles/2011/06/28/cyber-warfare-summit-acquisition-reform-strategies 
.aspx (reporting that “existing acquisition model . . . is ill-equipped to meet the fast-moving needs 
of cyber defense”); Bob Brewin, Air Force Cyber Chief: Speed Up Acquisitions Already, 
NEXTGOV (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.nextgov.com/defense/2012/02/air-force-cyber-chief-speed 
-up-acquisitions-already/50600/ (Air Force Space Command’s top general lamenting that DoD 
“acquires cyber capabilities the same way it buys aircraft or satellites,” which “can take years, 
while new developments in computer hardware and software can happen in days or months”); 
Rex B. Reagan & David F. Rico, Lean and Agile Acquisition and Systems Engineering: A 
Paradigm Whose Time Has Come, DEF. AT&L, Nov.–Dec. 2010, at 48, 52 (quoting General David 
H. Petraeus who called for “adaptive, responsive, and speedy acquisitions” because our enemies 
are “unlike any enemy fought in the past, demonstrating different tactics, techniques, and 
procedures from those found in conventional warfare”). 
 53. See, e.g., ISAAC R. PORCHE III ET AL., RAPID ACQUISITION & FIELDING FOR 
INFORMATION ASSURANCE & CYBER SECURITY IN THE NAVY iii (2013) (explaining that “today’s 
acquisition approach is not geared toward cyber security,” that we need “a cyber acquisition 
process that can react much faster than formal [DoD] channels, and that “the primary reason for 
this need is that many cyber technologies and products have fast development and deployment 
cycles that must be matched with rapid acquisition processes to avoid obsolescence when 
deployed”); MARY ANN LAPHAM ET AL., AGILE METHODS: SELECTED DOD MANAGEMENT AND 
ACQUISITION CONCERNS 2–3 (Carnegie Mellon Software Eng’g Inst., 2011) (describing need for 
“acquisition tempos that respond to operational tempos” and that the warfighter is endangered if 
he doesn’t have what he needs when he needs it); CARLTON NORTHERN ET AL., MITRE CORP., 
HANDBOOK FOR IMPLEMENTING AGILE IN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION (2010) (holding that “heavyweight” processes for major weapons are 
ill-suited to IT because when “finally fielded, the technology is dated and the functionality needed 
5 to 10 years before may no longer address the Warfighter’s current needs”). 
 54. DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 25, at 1. 
 55. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE 10 (2011), 
available at www.defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf 
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some ideas about the way forward. The DoD must figure out how to 
expedite the cyber-acquisition process. Before proceeding, however, 
three qualifications are in order. 
D. Three Qualifications 
This paper does not maintain that the latest weaponry ensures 
success in the physical or cyber domains. Technical advantage is at 
most necessary;56 alone, it is not sufficient.57 But since the Battle of 
Thermopylae, historians and tacticians have noted that battles often go 
to the soldiers who are best equipped.58 So it will be in cyberspace. 
Militaries with high-tech cyber defenses will sometimes fall prey to 
inferior low-tech foes. Yet that will be the exception. Other things being 
equal, superior technology will usually win. 
Second, not all software that the DoD uses is bespoke. While 
weapons systems require ground-up development, much of the 
software the DoD uses is for more mundane purposes: payroll, human 
 
 56. Examples of lower-tech armies defeating higher-tech rivals are not unknown, such as 
the Afghans repelling the Soviets. Such examples, however, are usually limited to Fabian tactics 
or guerilla warfare. In pitched battle, better-equipped armies time and again have proven 
devastatingly lethal. VICTOR DAVIS HANSON, CARNAGE AND CULTURE: LANDMARK BATTLES 
AND THE RISE TO WESTERN POWER 12–13, 19–20, 119–120 (2001) (arguing that our scientific and 
cultural tradition have given Western militaries an edge for 3,000 years). Further, myth sometimes 
misinterprets martial success. For example, though folklore sometimes depicts the Battle of Little 
Bighorn as a triumph of Stone Age weapons over hubris and modern arms, some argue that 
Custer’s famous defeat was due in part to the Sioux carrying repeating rifles and the 7th Cavalry 
carrying inferior single-shot carbines. See, e.g., RICHARD ALLAN FOX, JR., ARCHEOLOGY, 
HISTORY, AND CUSTER’S LAST BATTLE: THE LITTLE BIG HORN REEXAMINED 77–79 (1993). 
Stories about scrappy underdogs sell more books and movie tickets, but in real life the overdogs 
usually win. Having state-of-the-art weaponry is not always decisive, but it usually is. 
 57. Sometimes technology’s role is exaggerated. Blitzkrieg victories had less to do with 
superior German military technology than with superior tactics. The British invented the tank 
during World War I, and the French perfected it in the 1930s. Yet neither saw tanks as strategically 
important offensive weapons. The French preferred using tanks merely as support for infantry and 
artillery units. By contrast, Hitler’s success lay with the innovation of utilizing his Panzer 
divisions for rapid mechanized infantry attacks. See MAX BOOT, WAR MADE NEW: TECHNOLOGY, 
WARFARE, & THE COURSE OF HISTORY, 1500 TO TODAY 212–27 (2006); see also id. at 9–11 
(noting that while “the tools of war do matter,” he discourages “technological determinism” and 
urges that we avoid both undervaluing and overvaluing the role of technology in military history).  
 58. See VICTOR DAVIS HANSON, THE WESTERN WAY OF WAR: INFANTRY BATTLE IN 
CLASSICAL GREECE 55–56 (2009) (contrasting Greek armaments with the Persians who “in 
warlike spirit and strength . . . were not inferior, but they were unprotected with armor”) (quoting 
Herodotus 9.62.4)); Joseph Kleist, The Battle of Thermopylae: Principles of War on the Ancient 
Battlefield, 6 STUDIA ANTIQUA 75, 80–81 (2008) (attributing the Spartan’s relative success despite 
being vastly outnumbered in part to superior arms); Victor Davis Hanson, Hoplite Technology in 
Phalanx Battle, in HOPLITES: THE CLASSICAL GREEK BATTLE EXPERIENCE 63–64 (Victor Davis 
Hanson ed., 1991) (describing the “unique advantages of the hoplite shield and butt-spike to 
contemporary, phalanx warfare”); F.E. ADCOCK, THE GREEK AND MACEDONIAN ART OF WAR 
(1957) (explaining the significance of armor and shield technology to classical Greek infantry). 
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resources, logistics, and the like. When such software is available in 
the private market, the federal government should purchase it under 
FAR Part 12 (“Acquisition of Commercial Items”).59 Buying 
commercial is less expensive and “provides immediate access to 
rapidly evolving technology.”60 Where possible, purchasing 
commercial is always best. Accordingly, the agile development 
methods advocated in this paper concern only the unique requirements 
that cannot be met with commercial purchases. Such unique 
requirements will always be a large segment of DoD outlays.61 
Third, both government employees and government contractors 
write software for the military. Yet because uniformed members, 
civilians, and contractors are increasingly seamless in their duties,62 
especially in the DoD,63 this paper will not attempt to distinguish 
between them.64 Criticism of current methods and suggestions about 
how they may be improved apply equally to both groups. 
 
 59. FAR 12.101(a) (establishing the policy that federal agencies are to research 
“commercial” and “nondevelopmental items” to see if they meet government requirements). 
 60. IMPROVING CYBERSECURITY AND RESILIENCE THROUGH ACQUISITION, supra note 4, 
at 11. 
 61. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry is widely credited with the commercial 
revolution in defense procurement in 1990s. He recognized that DoD IT acquisition couldn’t keep 
pace with commercial advances, and advocated purchasing from commercial sources whenever 
possible. See, e.g., William Perry, Defense Must Open the Commercial Door, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 
23, 1998, at 5 (advocating buying commercial and holding that the DoD “must give up its unique 
buying practices and employ best commercial practices”); JACQUES S. GANSLER & WILLIAM 
LUCYSHYN, COMMERCIAL-OFF-SHELF (COTS): DOING IT RIGHT 7–8, app. (2008) (relating the 
“seminal” role of the 1994 “Perry Memo” on reshaping acquisitions to buy from commercial 
sources, and including the memorandum in the appendix). The problem is that this can go only so 
far. Much of what the military buys is truly unique and isn’t available commercially.  
 62. See Sondra Bell Nensala, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12: How HSPD-
12 May Limit Competition Unnecessarily and Suggestions for Reform, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 619, 
661–62 (2011) (describing the government’s 251% increase in the outsourcing of IT during the 
1990s); Dan Guttman, Governance by Contract: Constitutional Visions; Time for Reflection and 
Choice, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 321, 350 (2004) (explaining although “Cold War agencies played a 
famed role in funding cyber technologies,” in fact “the Government’s IT workforce, from the start, 
has been substantially private”). 
 63. See P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY 
INDUSTRY 62–64 (2008 ed.) (explaining that “many military functions,” especially in IT, “are 
being transferred to civilian specialists” and “[f]or those who wish to stay at the leading edge of 
military capabilities, there is a growing need for technical expertise, increasingly from private 
sources”).  
 64. Moreover, as explained below, infra note 194, government contractors are no less 
susceptible to the preference for the status quo software development method or less inclined to 
suffer from the cultural or bureaucratic resistance to the adoption of agile. So embedded are 
contractors in the government that they are, in fact, equally part of the problem. Accordingly, this 
paper makes no distinction between government employees and government contractors. 
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II. THE AGILE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT METHOD 
Before coming to agile, the next three sections will recount what 
came before, why that did not work, and how this led private industry 
to innovate. This is more than a history lesson. Understanding the agile 
method and understanding why the DoD has been a reluctant adopter 
require an understanding of what agile replaced and why. 
A. Pre-Agile Software Development Methods 
Since the advent of the computer, there have been three stages of 
software development. The first was characterized by the lack of any 
formal methodology and lasted through the 1970s. During this “code 
and fix” stage, programmers “wrote programs individualistically with 
little or no planning.”65 This ad hoc method worked well enough at first, 
but as computing power increased 10,000 fold so also did the 
complexity of software design, which in turn yielded exponential 
growth in the “consequences of success or failure.”66 As failing 
software imposed greater costs, innovators and managers sought to 
impose order and control costs using new development methods.67 
The waterfall method was foremost among the new, top-down 
software-development methods of the second stage. Development was 
supposed follow an “orderly series of sequential stages,” Leffingwell 
explains, starting with requirements and moving on to design, 
implementation, testing, and deployment.68 Notably, its putative 
founder warned in his first articulation of the waterfall method that it 
was unsuited to the large projects to which it was later applied en 
 
 65. See Nanda C. Surendra, Using an Ethnographic Process to Conduct Requirements 
Analysis for Agile Systems Development, 9 INFO. TECH. MGMT. 55 (2008). 
 66. DEAN LEFFINGWELL, AGILE SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS: LEAN REQUIREMENT 
PRACTICES FOR TEAMS, PROGRAMS, AND LEFFINGWELL, AGILE SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS THE 
ENTERPRISE 3–4 (2011). 
 67. Id. But see Joe Nandhakumar and David E. Avison, The Fiction of Methodological 
Development: A Fields Study of Information Systems Development, 12 INFO. TECH. & PEOPLE 176 
(1999) (arguing that methodologies are “a necessary fiction to present an image of control or to 
provide a symbolic status” and that “formal methodologies are too mechanistic to be of much use 
in the detailed, day-to-day organization of developers’ activities”). 
 68. LEFFINGWELL, AGILE SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS, supra note 66, at 5–6. 
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masse.69 Waterfall certainly imposed order,70 but did so at the expense 
of speed, price, and quality. In many ways, it was worse than what it 
replaced. Stalin infamously said, “You can’t make an omelet without 
breaking a few eggs.”71 Yet even Stalin would have hated waterfall: 
eggs were broken, but no omelets were to be had. 
Waterfall’s failures lay with some faulty assumptions. Most 
fundamental among these is that requirements can be can be defined 
and understood before development starts.72 In fact, requirements are 
notoriously hard to pin down.73 The causes for this epistemic problem 
are complicated,74 but Don Reinertsen captures well its significance. 
 
 69. Id. (citing Winston W. Royce, Managing the Development of Large Software Systems: 
Concepts and Techniques, 14 WESCON Tech. Papers (1970), reprinted in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING (1987)); see also CRAIG 
LARMAN, AGILE AND ITERATIVE DEVELOPMENT: A MANAGER’S GUIDE 105–06 (2004) 
(suggesting that “few actually read Royce’s original waterfall paper” and that “its iterative flavor 
was lost”); DEAN LEFFINGWELL, SCALING SOFTWARE AGILITY: BEST PRACTICES FOR LARGE 
ENTERPRISES 17–19 (2007) (explaining that Royce’s writings have been “widely 
misinterpreted”). 
 70. See BARRY W. BOEHM, RICHARD TURNER & GRADY BOOCH, BALANCING AGILITY 
AND DISCIPLINE: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED (2003) (explaining the benefits of “plan-drive 
methods” like waterfall are “predictability, stability, and high assurance”). 
 71. See Mark Edele, STALINIST SOCIETY: 1928–1953 viii (2011) (explaining that the Stalin 
quote is actually an “idiomatic translation” of a phrase meaning “if you chop wood, chips will 
fly”). 
 72. See VICTOR SZALVAY, DANUBE TECHS., INC., AN INTRODUCTION TO AGILE SOFTWARE 
DEVELOPMENT 2 (2004), http://www.danube.com/docs/Intro_to_Agile.pdf (explaining that “one 
of the biggest problems with waterfall is that it assumes that all project requirements can be 
accurately gathered at the beginning of the project”); LEFFINGWELL, SCALING SOFTWARE 
AGILITY, supra note 69, at 20–26 (describing the problems with this and three other assumptions 
in the waterfall model). 
 73. See NORTHERN ET AL., supra note 53, at 15 (explaining “the main reason for a high rate 
of failure in IT development projects” is that such projects are “fraught with uncertainty and 
ambiguity making it difficult to accurately define the end state up front”). 
 74. The fact that requirements are hard to pin down is partly due to problems with any new 
technology; customers know it when they see it but seldom know what they want up front. See 
CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE 
GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL 147–63 (1997) (arguing market for new technology is unknown and 
unknowable). And it is also partly due to  challenges specific to software development. See 
Szalvay, supra note 72, at 3 (arguing “software development is more like new product 
development than manufacturing” as “building bridges relies on physical and mathematical laws” 
but programming “has no clear laws or certainties on which to build”); Surendra, supra note 65 
(noting that developers are enthralled with engineers’ “mechanistic view” of development process 
but instead of designing “buildings and vehicles having relatively predictable requirements, 
[software] developers need to construct software applications that have rapidly changing user 
requirements”) (emphasis added); LEFFINGWELL, SCALING SOFTWARE AGILITY, supra note 69, at 
21 (explaining the difficulty of defining requirements for intangible creations in comparison with 
“mechanical and physical devices of the past”); NORTHERN ET AL. supra note 53, at 15 (explaining 
that when designing an “intangible or abstract” product it is “difficult for users to define what they 
want up front”). Cf. Fiction and Software, ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 2014, at 80–81 (reviewing Vikram 
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Noting that incorrect requirements accounted for 80%–85% of project 
failures,75 he says that the solution was to focus on listening to 
customers in order to better define their requirements, to which he 
counters: 
We ignored the fact that many customers don’t know what they 
want. We ignored the fact that even when they know what they want, 
they can’t describe it. We ignored the fact that even when they can 
describe it, they often describe a proposed solution rather than a real 
need.  
“The sad truth,” he concludes, “is that there is no one ‘voice of the 
customer.’” There is instead “a cacophony of voices asking for different 
things.”76 The effort to perfectly and completely define requirements 
beforehand is a fool’s errand.77 So waterfall’s failure, in large measure, 
lay with the incorrect assumption that—with enough elbow grease—
accurately forecasting requirements was possible. 
Compounding this false premise is inflexibility. This likely 
resulted from waterfall borrowing from manufacturing and 
construction industries’ methods, where “after-the-fact changes are 
costly, if not impossible.”78 Yet whatever its origin may be, this makes 
waterfall doubly bad: not only does waterfall start in the wrong 
direction, it fails to correct course.79 Nor was it designed to do so. 
Testing is delayed until it is costly and difficult to make changes.80 
Customers are rarely consulted, usually only once before and once after 
 
Chandra’s, GEEK SUBLIME: WRITING FICTION, CODING SOFTWARE (2014), which maintains that 
writing code “stands shoulder to shoulder with art” “[i]n making something out of nothing,” unlike 
the world of architecture and construction, described above, which design buildings and machines 
that subject to natural laws of the physical world). 
 75. Don Reinerstein, Foreword to LEFFINGWELL, AGILE SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS, supra 
note 66, at xxiii.  
 76. Id. 
 77. Some have mocked waterfall as the “requirements, delay, surprise” development 
model. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 47 n.2 (emphasis added). These 
“unhappy surprises” include “late-breaking negative feedback regarding design commitments 
that, when learned at a late stage in the process, can be very costly to revise.” Id. at 47. 
 78. MARY ANN LAPHAM ET AL., CONSIDERATIONS FOR USING AGILE IN DOD ACQUISITION 
6 (2010) (explaining that waterfall borrowed from these industries’ production models because 
there was no other to learn from). 
 79. See Lowell Lindstrom & Ron Jeffries, Extreme Programming and Agile Software 
Development Methodologies, 21 INFO. MGMT. SYS. 41 (2004) (describing rigidity of plan-driven 
processes). 
 80. See LARMAN, supra note 69, at 57–59 (explaining that waterfall puts off testing until 
the end); LEFFINGWELL, AGILE SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS, supra note 69, at 23–25 (explaining 
that late changes are technically difficult and costly because “interdependencies have already been 
built into the system”).  
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development.81 And the product is released only once.82 In short, 
sticking with the plan takes priority, which comes at the expense of the 
flexibility necessary for a timely response to end user feedback.83  
A third failing is waterfall’s overreliance on documentation. The 
various steps in the sequential process can be grouped into two main 
phases: analysis and coding.84 Months or years are spent on analysis to 
define and document requirements. Heavy documentation connects the 
two phases. Yet as Barry Boehm aptly says in his seminal article 
summarizing the failures of waterfall: “a prototype is worth 100,000 
words.”85 He also suggested that too much documentation can also 
cause “gold plating”86 and further inflexibility.87 In sum, waterfall’s 
documentation requirements impose a heavy burden on designers and 
customers alike that almost certainly outweighs the benefits. 
These failings and others88 made waterfall a flop. Rather than 
improving on the ad hoc method, development was slower, costlier, and 
of lower quality.89 Its shortcomings are well documented.90 
Surprisingly, despite its faults and the introduction of new methods that 
have proven to work better, waterfall is still widely used in the both 
private and public sectors.91 
 
 81. See Szalvay, supra note 71, at 3 (explaining that waterfall asks that customers “specify 
the entire system without having a chance to periodically see the progress and make adjustments 
to the requirements as needed”). 
 82. LAPHAM ET AL., supra note 78, at 6 (explaining that “one of the primary differences 
between Waterfall and Agile is the frequency with which usable releases are produced”). 
 83. See LEFFINGWELL, SCALING SOFTWARE AGILITY, supra note 69, at 21–22 (arguing that 
the second incorrect assumption underlying waterfall is that “change will be small and 
manageable”).  
 84. See Royce, supra note 69. 
 85. Barry Boehm, Anchoring the Software Process, 13 IEEE SOFTWARE 73, 74–75 (1996) 
(arguing that “written requirements specifications trying to describe the look and feel of a user 
interface were nowhere near as effective as a user-interface prototype”). 
 86. Id. at 74 (arguing that too much documentation “encourage[s] elaborate additions”). 
 87. Id. (arguing that fixed requirements “produce point solutions optimized around the 
original problem statement” that are inflexible and “frequently difficult to modify or to scale up”). 
 88. See, e.g., LEFFINGWELL, SCALING SOFTWARE AGILITY, supra note 69, at 22–26 
(explaining two more incorrect assumptions of the waterfall method). 
 89. See William H. Roetzheim, When the Software Becomes a Nightmare: Dealing with 
Failed Projects, 13 BUS. L. TODAY 42, 42–43 (2004) (describing the Standish Group’s research 
in the 1990s that “provided concrete evidence of a dirty little secret the information technology 
community had long suspected—software project failures were rampant and expensive”). 
 90. See LARMAN, supra note 69, at 74–76 (summarizing four studies on waterfall’s 
failures).  
 91. See LEFFINGWELL, AGILE SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS, supra note 66, at 8–9 
(discussing several reasons for waterfall’s persistence) 
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B. The Agile Method of Software Development 
Understanding why waterfall failed sets the stage for agile. Whole 
books are devoted to describing and implementing agile, but its main 
features can be neatly summarized in three points corresponding to the 
three main problems with waterfall. 
First, agile starts with a premise of epistemic modesty: we cannot 
know all requirements in advance, despite our best efforts.92 Explaining 
how agile corrects for waterfall in this respect, Leffingwell writes, “We 
do not assume that we, or our customers, can fully understand all of the 
requirements up front, or that anyone can possibly understand them all 
up front.” He continues, “We do not assume that change will be small 
and manageable. Rather, we assume that change will be constant[.]”93 
This may seem like a small difference, but it underpins all that makes 
agile work so effectively. 
Second, agile is above all flexible. It accomplishes this using an 
iterative process whereby simple versions of the software are delivered 
early and often.94 Each iteration includes a compressed version of the 
various waterfall phases (e.g., design, testing, and feedback),95 and this 
cycle is repeated over and over. Mary and Tom Poppendieck describe 
this iterative process: 
An iteration is a useful increment of software that is designed, 
programmed, tested, integrated, and delivered during a short, fixed 
timeframe. It is very similar to a prototype in product development 
except that an iteration produces a working portion of the final 
product. This software will be improved in future iterations, but it is 
a working, tested, integrated code from the beginning.96 
They explain the significance of this: “Iterations provide a dramatic 
increase in feedback over sequential software development, thus 
providing much broader communication” among customers, 
developers, and other stakeholders.”97 Agile assumes imperfect 
 
 92. Richard K. Cheng, On Being Agile, NEXTGOV (Sept. 23, 2010), 
http://www.nextgov.com/defense/2010/09/on-being-agile/47627/ (saying agile is “adaptive” 
rather than “predictive”). 
 93. LEFFINGWELL, SCALING SOFTWARE AGILITY, supra note 69, at 26 (emphasis original). 
 94. See MARY POPPENDIECK & TOM POPPENDIECK, LEAN SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT: AN 
AGILE TOOLKIT 27–34 (2003) (explaining that using discrete iterations helps identify “quality 
problems as soon as they occur”); LARMAN, supra note 69, at 9–11; LEFFINGWELL, SCALING 
SOFTWARE AGILITY, supra note 69, at 54 (saying that iterative development eliminates waterfall’s 
attempt to “build it right the first time”); LAPHAM ET AL., supra note 78, at 5–6 (explaining the 
process of focusing efforts by selecting stories from the queue). 
 95. See Szalvay, supra note 71, at 4.  
 96. POPPENDIECK & POPPENDIECK, supra note 94, at 28. 
 97. Id. 
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communication, but constant feedback helps bridge the gap, so that 
designers eventually come to understand and to provide what the 
customer actually wants. Agile succeeds so remarkably precisely 
because multiple failures are expected; designers are expected to fail 
early and often. Unlike waterfall, “[t]esters are involved from the first 
iteration” and “[d]esign problems are exposed early,” and “change-
tolerance is built into the system.”98 This is, Leffingwell writes, “the 
heartbeat of agility.”99 
Third, agile dumps waterfall’s documentation requirements.100 
Instead of such documentation, resources are redirected to developing 
working prototypes for customers to tinker with—and, again, such “a 
prototype is worth 100,000 words.”101 Boehm says that “written 
requirements specifications trying to describe the look and feel of a user 
interface [are] nowhere near as effective as a user-interface prototype.” 
So the developer’s and customer’s time is better spent; it is hard—or at 
least requires a great deal of imagination—to discuss meaningfully how 
to improve software that does not yet exist. But agile gives customers 
software they can see, use, and then provide immediate feedback on.  
Before proceeding, it seems worth mentioning that agile is more 
than the latest management-speak patois or business-school gimmick. 
Some claim that its roots date back to Roman times.102 It is unclear how 
tenable that classical pedigree is, and ascertaining agile's genealogy is 
beyond the scope of this paper. But agile does tap into some basic 
insights of free-market economics. Its bottom-up approach works for 
the same reason the free market’s “invisible hand” outperforms central 
planners.103 Were accurate forecasting possible, waterfall probably 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. LEFFINGWELL, AGILE SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS, supra note 66, at 155–69. 
 100. See LARMAN, supra note 69, at 326–27 (describing agile documentation methods that 
reduces preparation time from months or years to hours); LEFFINGWELL, AGILE SOFTWARE 
REQUIREMENTS, supra note 66, at 284 (saying traditional documentation-heavy requirements are 
“eliminated, reduced in scope, or replaced by lightweight substitutes”); LEFFINGWELL, SCALING 
SOFTWARE AGILITY, supra note 69, at 215–17 (explaining that whereas extensive documentation 
was “part and parcel of the waterfall model itself,” “in agile these documents do not exist”). 
 101. Boehm, supra note 85, at 74–75. 
 102. See Reagan & Rico, supra note 52, at 50 (claiming agile has roots in Roman legion 
tactics and experimental techniques used by Leonardo, Newton, Pasteur, and Edison). 
 103. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 35 (R.H. Campbell & R.H. Skinner, eds., 1976) (1776) (first coining the image of the 
“invisible hand”); see also TODD G. BUCHHOLZ, NEW IDEAS FROM DEAD ECONOMISTS 19–25 
(1989) (summarizing Smith’s “invisible hand” whereby society benefits from each man pursuing 
his own interests). Incidentally, it is no accident that agile and similar innovations emerged from 
where they did as “[i]f there is an industry that exemplifies the virtues of the private sector, it is 
technology.” Companies and the State, ECONOMIST (SPECIAL REPORT), Feb. 22, 2014, at 12. 
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would work. Alas, it is not. Therein lies the epistemic problem. Agile 
takes a more modest approach and avoids that problem, not pretending 
to know in advance what customers need or want. Instead, it listens, 
adapts, experiments, and then listens some more. In this way it defers 
to the wisdom of the masses, and thereby resembles the operation of 
free markets. Agile is more than a passing fad. 
C. Agile’s Proven Success 
Agile development is not without critics.104 Nor is there a single 
method applied uniformly across the field; schisms and heterodoxies 
abound.105 This paper does not advocate for any particular sect. Rather, 
it considers how agile—in a general or ecumenical form— compares 
with waterfall, and finds that agile has a much better record of success.  
Not only does anecdotal evidence suggest that agile works in the 
private sector, empirical evidence confirms this.106 For example, a 2004 
study by the Standish Group showed that the use of agile cut failure-
 
 104. See, e.g., LAPHAM ET AL., supra note 78 at 49–51 (discussing six common objections 
to agile, especially as applied to the DoD). 
 105. See LEFFINGWELL, AGILE SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS, supra note 66, at 10–29 
(describing agile’s various forms including iterative/incremental, dynamic systems development 
method, adaptive software development, extreme programming, open unified process, scrum, 
lean, crystal methods, and Kanban).  
 106. See LARMAN, supra note 69, at 63–109 (providing what Szalvay, supra note 72, at 10, 
calls “the most comprehensive empirical evidence for Agile/Iterative of any book currently on the 
market,” and what LEFFINGWELL, SCALING SOFTWARE AGILITY, supra note 69, at 19, calls the 
best source for “solid, statistical evidence of how [waterfall] fails us again and again”) (citing, 
e.g., Alan D. McCormack, Product Development Processes that Work, 42 MIT SLOAN MGMT. 
REV. 75 (2001) (two-year study by Harvard business professors finding iterative “approach to 
software development results in speedier process and higher-quality products”); Alan D. 
MacCormack et al., Exploring the Trade-offs Between Productivity & Quality in the Selection of 
Software Development Practices, 20 IEEE SOFTWARE 78 (2003) (describing results of a follow-
up study showing 50% of variation in productivity resulted from two iterative practices—releasing 
a partial product with lower functionality and daily builds with regression testing); Neil B. 
Harrison & James O. Complien, Patterns of Productive Software Organizations, BELL LABS 
TECH. J. 140 (1996) (finding a consistent pattern of highly successful software projects where 
iterative methods were used); David Cohen, Gary Larson & Bill Ware, Improving Software 
Investments Through Requirements Validation, IEEE 26TH SOFTWARE ENGINEERING WORKSHOP 
106 (2001) (summarizing study of 400 projects spanning 15 years showing “software pollution” 
rate was significantly reduced by adopting iterative processes); SHINE TECHNOLOGIES, AGILE 
METHODOLOGIES SURVEY RESULTS (2003) (describing survey results about agile showing that 
88% believed it improved productivity, 84% improved quality); STANDISH GROUP INT’L, CHAOS 
MANIFESTO 2013, at 5 (2013), http://versionone.com/assets/img/files/ChaosManifesto2013.pdf. 
(illustrating value of iterative practices following study of 23,000 projects); Andrew Thomas, IT 
Projects Sink or Swim, BRIT. COMPUTER SCI. REV. (2001) (summarizing study of 1,000 UK 
projects showing 90% of successful projects lasted less than twelve months, and 47% less than 
six); CAPERS JONES, PATTERNS OF SOFTWARE SYSTEMS FAILURE AND SUCCESS (1996) (large 
sample study showing that the larger the project, the more likely it will fail)). 
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rates in half.107 Their latest report partly attributes increasing success-
rates from 29% to 39% from 2004 to 2013 to using agile.108 Another 
study claims agile decreased costs by up to 61%, cut delivery time by 
up to 58%, and reduced defects by up to 81%.109  
These numbers suggest that if the federal government could 
successfully implement agile, not only would software quality and 
delivery times improve, billions in savings would accrue—and not only 
in the DoD.110 Critics may object that agile is impossible for the 
government to implement. In fact, the federal government was a 
pioneer in iterative software-development methods from 1950s through 
the 1970s,111 and there is no reason to think the federal government 
could not learn to be agile again.112 Remarkable savings, better value, 
and faster delivery are within the government’s reach. 
III. THE HISTORY OF FEDERAL SOFTWARE PROCUREMENT AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
The previous section detailed the history of the waterfall and agile 
software-development methods. This section starts with a broad 
overview the federal government’s IT-procurement practices and 
reforms since the 1960s. Then it describes the government’s pioneering 
efforts with iterative software development (a precursor to agile), its 
adoption of waterfall and the disastrous consequences that resulted, and 
finally its long history with agile. This background is necessary to 
understanding why the federal government, despite the rhetoric about 
agile methods, is still stuck in the past. 
 
 107. Szalvay, supra note 72, at 10 (citing STANDISH GROUP INT’L, CHAOS CHRONICLES 
(2004) (indicating agile reduced failure rates from 31% to 15%)). 
 108. See CHAOS MANIFESTO 2013, supra note 106. 
 109. See LAPHAM ET AL. (2010), supra note 78, at 36 (citing Jim Highsmith, Beyond Scope, 
Schedule, and Cost: Measuring Agile Performance, Agile Development Conference, Orlando, 
Florida, 2009)). 
 110. Perhaps other agencies will require bespoke software less frequently than the DoD; 
however, to the extent they need software tailored to meet unique needs that are not otherwise 
supplied in the private market, agile is no less applicable to them and might save additional 
billions. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text. 
 111. See infra notes 125–132 and accompanying text. 
 112. Some have argued that agile only works for smaller organizations or smaller projects. 
Leffingfwell’s entire book, supra note 69, is devoted to arguing that agile can work on a larger 
scale and for large enterprises. The federal government and the DoD should be no exception. 
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A. An Overview of IT Procurement Policy Since the 1960s 
From the 1965 until 1996, the General Services Administration 
exercised central control over IT purchases.113 With the Clinger–Cohen 
Act’s repeal of the Brooks Act,114 IT purchasing reverted to individual 
agencies,115 and IT- and non-IT processes were thereby merged because 
it was thought that having separate processes was too “cumbersome 
and slow.”116 Since then, IT purchases, both hardware and software,117 
are done using “normal procurement procedures following a few 
special rules in FAR 39.”118 
While agencies have purchasing authority, the Office of 
Management and Budget still has responsibility over standards and 
policy.119 Congress has also established a number of requirements: that 
agencies have a Chief Information Officer,120 follow planning 
requirements,121 and use modular contracts.122 It has also required 
OMB to promote various contract-management programs.123  
B. The Federal Government’s Experience with Iterative, 
Waterfall, and Agile Software Development Methods 
Some may suppose the government cannot do agile either because 
of its size or to inherent limitations on the public sector’s efficiency or 
 
 113. 40 U.S.C. § 759 (1995); see also John, supra note 47, at 4, 7–8 (describing the United 
States’ failed experiment with consolidated IT from the mid-1960s until 1994). 
 114. Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, div. 
E, tit. LI, § 5101, 110 Stat. 186, 680 (1996) (codified at 40 U.S.C. § 11302). 
 115. 40 U.S.C. § 11314 (2013). 
 116. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 42, at 28. 
 117. 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (2014). 
 118. JOHN CIBINIC, JR., RALPH C. NASH & CHRISTOPHER R. YUKINS, FORMATION OF 
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 1104 (4th ed. 2011). (referencing 48 C.F.R. pt. 39). 
 119. Id. at 1104–05 (citing 44 U.S.C. § 3504(h); 40 U.S.C. § 11302(b); OMB Circular A-
130, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a130_a130trans4). 
 120. 40 U.S.C. § 11315 (2013). 
 121. Id. § 11312(b); see also OMB Circular A-130, supra note 119, at ¶ 8.b(4); 48 C.F.R. § 
39.102 (2014) (establishing that agencies should consider “risks, benefits, and costs” of IT). 
 122. 41 U.S.C. § 2308 (2013) (mandating modular systems); see also CIBINIC ET AL., supra 
note 118, at 1108–09 (explaining that modular contracts are “successive acquisitions of 
interoperable increments”). But see Acquisition White Paper on Modular Contracting (Jul. 26, 
1997) (GSA’s warning about risks of modular contracting because modules may not be fully 
compatible).  
 123. See 40 U.S.C. § 11303 (requiring OMB to encourage performance- and results-based 
management for agency IT purchases); § 11302(b) (promotion of acquisition and capital planning 
processes); § 11312 (detailing capital planning and investment control); § 11313 (describing 
performance- and results-based management); see also OMB Circular A-130, supra note 119, at 
¶ 8.b(1) (implementing these policies). 
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competency.124 In fact, not only is the government capable of using 
agile, it was a pioneer in the use of iterative and incremental methods 
that were the precursors to agile. For example, for several decades 
starting in the 1950s, the DoD used these methods to develop software 
for weapons systems including the Army’s artillery command-and-
control system,125 the Navy’s Trident submarine,126 and LAMPS 
helicopter-ship system,127 and the Air Force’s air defense system.128 
The DoD was not alone. NASA used such methods for the Project 
Mercury, the first manned spaceflight program,129 and for the space 
shuttle.130  
These were not exceptions. Larman explains that IBM’s Federal 
Services Division and its rival developer, TRW, frequently used 
incremental methods in the 1970s and that their use was “a well-known 
practice.”131 Finally, the use of iterative engineering methods was not 
limited only to software development. For example, the Air Force 
utilized lean or agile manufacturing methods “to usher in the jet age 
and to rapidly evolve experimental aircraft such as X-15, SR-71, U-2, 
F-111, F-117, and many others.”132 Such methods are considered close 
cousins, if not parents, to agile software-development methods.133 
 
 124. See supra note 112. 
 125. Doris Tamanaha, An Integrated Rapid Prototyping Methodology for Command and 
Control Systems, 7 ACM SIGSOFT SOFTWARE ENGINEERING NOTES 169 (1982) (describing 
Army project using iterative methods for designing software for artillery command and control in 
1984–88)). 
 126. Don O’Neil, J. OF SYSTEMS & SOFTWARE 77 (1983) (relating the use of iterative 
software methods for development of the Trident submarine in 1972). 
 127. See LARMAN, supra note 69, at 83–84 (describing a four-year, 200 person project with 
millions of lines of code that whose every delivery “was on time and under budget”). 
 128. See Carolyn Wong, A Successful Software Development, 10 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON 
SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 714–27 (1984) (describing the use of iterative methods to develop the 
air defense system in 1977–80 and their initial problems with developing complex software using 
waterfall).  
 129. See LARMAN, supra note 69, at 79–81 (citing Craig Larman & Victor Basili, Iterative 
and Incremental Development: A Brief History, 36 COMPUTER 47 (2003) (describing incremental 
software methods used in Project Mercury in the 1950s)). 
 130. William A Madden & Kyle Y. Rone, Design, Development, Integration: Space Shuttle 
Primary Flight Software System, 27 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 14 (1984) (describing 
NASA’s use of iterative approach for space shuttle’s flight software system in 1977–80 as 
waterfall method was unsuitable given the frequently changing requirements of such a complex 
system). 
 131. LARMAN, supra note 69, at 82–84 (describing TRW’s work on the Army’s ballistic 
missile defense system in the 1970s) (citing R.D. Williams, Managing the Development of 
Reliable Software, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON RELIABLE 
SOFTWARE (1975)). 
 132. Id. at 51. 
 133. Id. 
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For reasons that remain unclear, the DoD mandated use of 
waterfall methods in the 1980s.134 Efficiency suffered.135 The 
implementation under DoD-STD-2167 provide a striking case study of 
waterfall’s shortcomings: “Out of a total cost of $37 billion for the 
sample set, 75% of the projects failed or were never used, and only 2% 
were used without extensive modification.”136 “DoD planners came to 
believe that the key to successful weapon systems was to apply rigid 
manufacturing principles to acquisition and systems engineering.”137 
Thus, a series of tightly controlled procurement regulations was 
instituted, which lasted until the mid-1990s.138 This was typical of a 
government that had lost its way and had forgotten about the virtue of 
iterative development methods139—to the detriment of end-users and 
the public fisc.140  
For much of the 1980s, waterfall was mandatory for the DoD’s 
software development and procurement.141 Later in the decade, 
following the “stultifying influence” of waterfall on large IT projects, 
those requirements were lifted and a new standard adopted to allow for 
use of iterative and incremental methods.142 Despite this, the regulation 
 
 134. For a possible explanation, see infra note 137. 
 135. LARMAN, supra note 69, at 76 (citing R. Solon, Benchmarking the ROI from Software 
Process Improvement, 5 DOD SOFTWARE TECH. NEWS 6 (2002) (study of 43,700 projects showed 
not only that agile was more efficient than lean but that only “loosely” applying waterfall method 
caused significant productivity improvements)). 
 136. Id. at 87 (citing Lt Col (ret.) Joe Jarzombek, The 5th Annual JAWS S3 Proceedings 
(1999)). 
 137. Reagan & Rico, supra note 52, at 51. It would be an interesting historical or 
sociological question to consider whether the adoption of top-down controls was considered 
necessary following the Sputnik scare in 1957. We now know that Soviet Union would later 
collapse in part because it could not keep up with the rapid growth in Western technology. So it 
seems strange in hindsight that we might have adopted authoritarian methods to expedite defense 
acquisition and technological development. Yet that strangeness is anachronistic. At the time it 
might have seemed that top-down controls were necessary in order to keep up with our Cold War 
rival, which was unfettered by free-market economics and, thus, winning the space race. See, e.g., 
PAUL DICKSON, SPUTNIK: THE SHOCK OF THE CENTURY 223–24 (2011) (describing the clamor 
for radical changes to U.S. policy in order to keep up with Russian technology). 
 138. LARMAN, supra note 69, at 87 (citing four DoD regulations and explaining that “these 
were only the tip of an iceberg of thousands of lower-level standards making up . . . the defense 
acquisition system”). 
 139. See id. at 85–87 (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL 
EVOLUTION AND STATUS OF FAA’S AUTOMATION PROGRAM, GAO/T-RCED/AIMD-98-85 (1998) 
(describing the FAA’s disastrous efforts to design a new air traffic control system using the 
waterfall method resulting in $2.6 billion spent and nothing to show for it)). 
 140. Larman explains that prior to waterfall, iterative and ad hoc methods coexisted. See id. 
at 102 (explaining that iterative was a “contemporary alternative” with ad hoc). 
 141. Id. at 87 (citing DOD-STD-2167). 
 142. Id. at 88–89 (adopting DOD-STD-2167 in February 1988). 
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“contain[ed] an implied preference for the waterfall model, due to its 
document-driven milestones approach.”143 
After years of failure with waterfall, a 1994 study recommended 
iterative methods.144 Soon after, a regulation was introduced removing 
any bias favoring waterfall.145 Six years later, a new instruction was 
introduced, which again recommended iterative methods.146 
In 2003, the DoD implemented a “multiple milestone” process 
that introduced more flexibility into acquisition processes.147 
Dissatisfaction with this process led to further revisions in 2007 and 
2008148 to what are commonly called the DoD 5000 series. Though 
these regulations both mentioned and recommended agile-like 
methods,149 they were still blamed for insufficiently clearing the path 
for agile reforms.150 
In March 2009, the Defense Science Board found the conventional 
procurement system was “inadequate” for cyber acquisitions because 
of the “short half-life” of commercial IT.151 This report encouraged 
further agile reforms in Congress.152 On October 9, 2009, President 
Obama signed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 
2010,153 which mandated agile procurement methods.154 Thirteen 
months later, the DoD’s report to Congress again promised its recent 
reforms would “enable DoD information capability projects to take 
advantage of the benefits of agile development methods[.]”155 Congress 
 
 143. Id. at 89. 
 144. LARMAN, supra note 69, at 89–90 (citing REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD 
TASK FORCE ON ACQUIRING DEFENSE SOFTWARE COMMERCIALLY (1994)). 
 145. Id. at 90 (citing MIL-STD-498 (Dec. 1994) (establishing uniform requirements for 
software documentation and development)). 
 146. Id. (referencing DoDI 5000.2). 
 147. DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 25, at 29–30. 
 148. Id. at 30–32. 
 149. See DoDD 5000.01, § 4.3.2 (replacing “spiral” from the previous version with 
“incremental” as the “preferred” development method for advanced technology); DODI 5000.02, 
Enclosure 2, ¶ 5.a (describing the technology development phase as “iterative”). 
 150. See, e.g., LAPHAM ET AL., supra note 78, at 12–13 (noting a “strong belief that is 
prevalent across the DoD community” is that the DoD 5000 series is “rigid in requiring a 
traditional Waterfall process for the development of software”). 
 151. Id. at ix. 
 152. See id. at 42–45 (citing several studies since the Goldwater-Nichols legislation in 1986 
stressing the need for acquisitions reform). 
 153. See Cheng, supra note 92.  
 154. National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
84, 123 Stat. 2190 (2009). 
 155. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, A NEW APPROACH FOR DELIVERING 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY CAPABILITIES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 12 (2012) (report to 
Congress pursuant to Section 804 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2010). 
08_ARTICLE_SCHOENI (DO NOT DELETE) 6/15/2015 11:39 AM 
410 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 31 
considered yet another IT reform bill in 2013: the Federal Information 
Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA). It was originally an 
independent bill, was added to the National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA) of 2014, and was finally removed for additional 
consideration.156  
The DoD has taken clandestine efforts toward rapid cyber 
procurement, but secrecy makes it hard to appraise their efficacy.157 If 
the past is any guide, the results may be underwhelming. For some time 
the DoD has spoken the language of agile158 without actually doing or 
being agile. Though words like “agile” and “lean” may dominate DoD 
press releases about improving cyber-procurement methods, there is 
little show for this rhetorical flourish, at least not at the DoD-wide 
level. 
Although the DoD as a whole has yet to fully implement its agile 
ideals, some individual services have taken steps in that direction. For 
example, on November 28, 2005, the Secretary of the Air Force signed 
a memo directing the use of lean methods,159 and his successor signed 
an acquisition improvement plan on May 4, 2009, which also featured 
 
 156. FITARA was originally H.R. 1232, but on June 14, 2013 the House approved adding it 
as an amendment to the NDAA of 2014. David Perera, House Approves FITARA Version as Part 
of National Defense Bill, FIERCEGOVERNMENTIT (June 17, 2013), 
http://www.fiercegovernmentit.com/story/house-approves-fitara-version-part-national-defense-
bill/2013-06-17; Dietrich Knauth, Congress Prepares Last-Ditch Attempt At Defense Policy Bill, 
LAW360 (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/494217/congress-prepares-last-ditch 
-attempt-at-defense-policy-bill (explaining other aspects of the NDAA held up its passage and it 
appears that lawmakers will reach an agreement before the bill expires). Ultimately, Congress 
removed FITARA from the 2014 NDAA, and postponed its consideration. Dietrich Knauth, 
Government Contracts Regulation And Legislation To Watch in 2014, LAW360 (Jan. 1, 2014) 
(explaining that the delay was caused in part by worries about the rollout of Heathcare.gov and a 
consensus that “the way the government buys technology is too slow, too burdened by 
inefficiencies and too prone to high-profile failures”). 
 157. See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima, Pentagon to Fast-Track Cyberweapons Acquisition, WASH. 
POST (Apr. 9, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-04-09/world/35453841_1_weapon 
-systems-pentagon-technology-and-logistics (reporting on this development from an undisclosed 
16-page Pentagon report describing a new rapid cyber procurement program). 
 158. “Agile” has become a popular word in defense circles, and has lost currency with 
repetition. See, e.g., QUADRENNIAL, supra note 28, at 1, 73, 81, 103 (using “agile” four times); 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT PLAN FY 2012–FY 2013, at 2, 6, 12, 24, 37 
(using “agile” seven times and describing two of its seven goals using that adjective); DEFENSE 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY STRATEGIC PLAN: 2013–2018, at 2, 4–5, 10, 14 (2013) (using 
“agile” six times). 
 159. See LEFFINGWELL, AGILE SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS, supra note 66 (equating lean 
and agile); Information Technology Lean Process Streamlines Acquisition, U.S. FED. NEWS (Jan. 
23, 2006), available at 2006 WLNR 2114017 (reporting that Secretary Michael Wynne signed a 
memo directing use of lean acquisition methods). 
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agile methods.160 Such initiatives have proven more than empty slogans 
and have led to pockets of success.161 Lapham cites the Air Force’s 
FIST program and recommend duplicating its success with smaller 
teams.162 The Air Force’s Electronic Systems Center (ESC) at Hanscom 
AFB, Massachusetts announced it had started to develop capabilities in 
order to “to fill technology gaps within hours or weeks.”163 And the 
Army is fielding a new agile system for its communications-networks 
acquisitions.164  
Unfortunately, although the authority to use iterative methods has 
been available for nearly two decades,165 the programs listed in the last 
paragraph are exceptions. To date, agile reforms have been meager.166 
This should come as no surprise because companies and cultures 
“emphasiz[ing] hierarchical management and control, and detailed 
predictive planning [are] the slowest adopters” of agile, and few 
institutions are more hierarchical than the DoD.167 The next section 
considers such cultural impediments and other reasons agile has not 
taken root and makes suggestions for improvement. 
 
 160. AIR FORCE ACQUISITION IMPROVEMENT PLAN 6 (2009) (favoring an “incremental 
acquisition strategy” whereby “early, if only partial, operational capabilit[ies] [are] pursued rather 
than strategies that deliver the 100% solution[s]” that are too costly, late, or risky). 
 161. See, e.g., LAPHAM, supra note 53, at 2 (describing interviews with successful agile 
programs used in preparing report: “Joint Mission Planning System (JMPS), Single Integrated Air 
Picture (SIAP), Operationally Responsive Space (ORS), Virtual Mission Operations Center 
(VMOC), Space Radar, an Army tank program, and some other classified programs”). 
 162. Id. at 43. 
 163. See Brewin, supra note 52. ESC has since been reorganized under the Air Force 
Material Command’s new Life Cycle Management Center (LCMC). See U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-366, AIR FORCE ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS CENTER (2013) 
(detailing the reorganization of Hanscom AFB’s under LCMC). 
 164. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-179, ARMY NETWORK: SIZE AND 
SCOPE OF MODERNIZATION INVESTMENT MERIT INCREASED OVERSIGHT (2013). 
 165. See supra notes 145–146 and accompanying text. 
 166. See, e.g., Porche et al., supra note 53, at xiv (acknowledging that agile reforms will not 
be easy for the Navy); Reagan & Rico, supra note 52, at 52 (arguing iterative methods are here to 
stay, but “there is a long way to go” in terms of implementing such reforms); Air Force Materiel 
Command Building Acquisition Plan For Cyber Purchases, 20 INSIDE THE AIR FORCE (Dec. 18, 
2009), available at 2009 WLNR 25490253 (AFMC commander acknowledging that the Air Force 
had not figured out how to do agile cyber procurement); Teri Takai, DoD CIO’s 10-Point Plan for 
IT Modernization (2012) (urging agile acquisitions reforms), http://dodcio.defense.gov/Portals 
/0/Documents/ITMod/CIO%2010%20Point%20Plan%20for%20IT%20Modernization.pdf. 
 167. LARMAN, supra note 69, at 87. 
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IV. PROBLEMS WITH ADOPTING AGILE IN THE DOD AND HOW TO FIX 
THEM 
This closing section first demonstrates that DoD software 
development still uses the waterfall. Despite numerous initiatives and 
much rhetoric, agile has not been widely adopted. It then presents 
studies showing that laws or regulations are not the primary reason. 
This is mainly a function of culture. It offers suggestions for changing 
the culture. It closes with some laws and regulations that could be 
amended to more fully promote agile reform. 
A. DoD Software Development Still Resembles The Waterfall 
Method 
Notwithstanding recent changes in the laws and regulations 
governing acquisitions supposedly implementing agile, the DoD is still 
doing waterfall. For simplicity, this section will focus on the same three 
shortcomings listed above to illustrate how much the DoD still uses 
waterfall: a faulty assumption about what can be known beforehand 
about requirements; inflexibility after coding has begun; and onerous 
documentation requirements. 
First, though the DoD purports to be agile, it relies on lengthy up-
front analysis to define requirements. “Current DoD processes,” the 
National Research Council explains, “put great emphasis on detailing 
requirements before a program is approved to start,” that results in 
“years of requirements development” and in turn leads to “the delivery 
of IT systems that are trying to meet requirements that have long since 
changed or are continuing to shift.”168 
Two examples illustrate the tendency to ignore or misunderstand 
the application of agile to DoD IT acquisition. One is the Air Force’s 
Acquisition Improvement Plan. Though praised above for promoting 
agile,169 this plan also displays a certain cognitive dissonance. It uses 
some agile jargon,170 yet on closer inspection its wording and guidance 
 
 168. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 42, at 41; id. at 85 (recommending that 
“big-R” replace “small-R” requirements, meaning that “high-level descriptions that are expected 
to be fairly stable” replace “more detailed requirements” that “evolve” as development 
progresses). 
 169. See AIR FORCE ACQUISITION IMPROVEMENT PLAN, supra note 160. 
 170. Compare id. (“warfighters must resist the temptation to pursue high risk requirements 
that are too costly and take too long to deliver in favor of an incremental acquisition strategy” and 
favoring “incremental strategies that deliver early, if only partial, capabilities”) with 1 (implying 
that requirement can be forecasted by faulting the current system for “requirements continu[ing] 
to creep well beyond their initial scope), 2 (citing a study faulting the Air Force for having 
“unstable requirements” implying that requirements can be predicted and controlled), 5–6 
(discussing requirements generation and in addition to the agile-friendly language quoted above 
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sound more like waterfall. To be fair, this is complicated by the fact 
that this document refers to defense acquisition generally and not only 
to IT acquisition.171 Yet there is still a glaring inconsistency. 
The other is the DoD’s report to Congress in response to Section 
804 of the NDAA of 2010172 mandating agile IT acquisition. Though it 
uses words like “agile” or “iterative” repeatedly,173 devotes 61 pages to 
planning for agile,174 and starts strong on requirements development,175 
it quickly becomes clear that the requirements process is not agile, 
iterative, or simple. One is soon lost in a sea of acronyms and 
abbreviations for the various steps.176 Earlier the report failed to 
conceal its pining for the waterfall metrics of yore, listing among its 
accomplishments “well-scoped and well-defined requirements.”177 
Either the authors did not recognize the inconsistency178 or they are 
 
making several recommendations more in keeping with waterfall, e.g., saying requirements 
generation must occur “early” and be a cross-functional endeavor, implying this is a lengthy 
process balancing several competing objectives), 7 (mandating that requirements be “finite, 
measurable, [and] prioritized,” again taking as given that creating such a list of requirements is 
desirable), and 7 (“freez[ing] program requirements at contract award,” once again making the 
assumption that requirements can be forecasted). 
 171. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 42, at 40–41 (conceding that the 
DoD’s caution and “emphasis on detailing requirements before a program is approved to start” 
might make sense for major weapons systems, but arguing that is unsuitable to IT acquisitions). 
 172. NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–84, § 804, 123 Stat. 2190, 2402–03 
(2009) (“Implementation of New Acquisition Process for Information Technology Systems”). 
 173. See A NEW APPROACH FOR DELIVERING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY CAPABILITIES IN 
THE DOD, supra note 155, at 7, 9, 12 (using “agile” three times); id. at 2, 4, 8–10, 17 (using 
“iterative” six times). 
 174. See, e.g., id. at 12 (assuring Congress that new common infrastructure will enable the 
DoD “to take advantage of the benefits of agile development methods”). 
 175. Id. at 14–15 (noting new process “will need to acknowledge the uncertainty associated 
with the dynamic IT environment and incorporate the flexibility”). 
 176. “Initial requirements will be defined at the mission level[.]” Id. at 15. In addition to a 
half dozen other requirements, these broad requirement definitions will include “key performance 
parameters approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)[.]” Id. Processes will 
differ by area, but “all processes will include business process reengineering and an 
implementation management plan describing all DOTMLPF actions necessary to prepare the user 
community before receiving the IT capability.” Id. Requirements must also be run through the 
“JCIDS process to streamline requirements.” Id. DoD business software must also be run through 
the Business Capability Lifecycle (BCL). Id. at 16. Several changes are specifically mandated in 
Section 804. For example, instead of “traditional acquisition project milestones,” under the new 
reforms these will be replaced by “in-process reviews by integrated governance councils with 
decision authority[.]” Id. In short, this is still a very complicated requirements development 
process more akin to the waterfall than to the agile method it espouses. 
 177. Id. at 4. 
 178. That is, if requirements can be accurately “scoped” or “defined” then why use agile? 
The inability to perfectly requirements is what makes agile necessary in the first place.  
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passive–aggressive, using the agile terminology but atavistically 
clinging to waterfall practices.179 
Second, studies suggest the DoD is still locked into a rigid process 
that is inflexible once coding has started.180 Anecdotal evidence also 
suggests this is the case, given top officials quoted above on continuing 
problems with slow cyber procurement.181 
Third, the DoD still requires reams of documentation. Contractors 
who are familiar with agile and then work with the DoD complain that 
the DoD wants to have its cake and eat it, too.182 It calls itself agile but 
uses the paperwork that was the hallmark of waterfall; it’s business as 
usual. Documentation “generated for agile is tailored to meet the 
minimum required” by developers, whereas “the DoD still rel[ies] 
heavily upon milestone reviews,183 documents, reports, and selected 
metrics.”184 Over-documentation reflects the false premise about 
requirements; much effort goes into “granular” estimates and forecasts 
for the Integrated Master Schedule.185 Program managers also demand 
the “full complement” of documentation to show progress.186 Thus, a 
common complaint among contractors is that the government has not 
 
 179. Lapham suggests a third option. Organizations undergoing transformational change 
that comes with adopting a new business model often go through a period where their “espoused 
values” fail to align with “basic assumptions.” LAPHAM, supra note 53, at 18–19 (citing EDGAR 
H. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP (1992)). Perhaps this is not only a more 
charitable explanation but also more accurate. 
 180. Mary Lapham, DoD Agile Adoption: Necessary Considerations, Concerns, and 
Changes, CROSSTALK 31 (Jan. 2012), http://www.crosstalkonline.org/storage/issue-archives 
/2012/201201/201201-Lapham.pdf (summarizing a Carnegie-Mellon Software Engineering 
Institute (SEI) study and describing some cultural barriers to full implementation of agile in the 
DoD); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-681, EFFECTIVE PRACTICES AND 
FEDERAL CHALLENGES IN APPLYING AGILE METHODS (2012) (explaining various obstacles in 
shifting from waterfall to more flexible agile methods); LAPHAM, supra 53, at 14 (explaining that 
adopting agile processes to replace waterfall will require substantial cultural change within the 
DoD). 
 181. See generally supra note 52 (quoting a half dozen commentators and officials on how 
slow DoD IT acquisition process is); see also Clark, supra note 46 (top cyber commander saying 
“he wanted to buy ‘faster, better, quicker’ since the cyber realm doesn’t really allow for the seven 
to 10 years a standard acquisition program usually takes.”); INSIDE THE AIR FORCE, supra note 
166 (Air Force general officer acknowledging that Air Force still has not figured out how to do 
rapid cyber procurement). 
 182. But see infra note 194. 
 183. Agile proponents mock such documentation, which agile methods render superfluous, 
as “high ritual” or “high ceremony.” See LAPHAM, supra note 53, at 37 (citing ALISTAIR 
COCKBURN, AGILE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT: THE COOPERATIVE GAME (2006 2d ed.)).  
 184. William Broadus, The Challenges of Being Agile, DEF. AT&L 5, 8 (Jan. 2013). 
 185. LAPHAM ET AL., supra note 78, at 17. 
 186. Id. at 18. 
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adjusted its documentation requirements to correspond to supposedly 
agile methods.187  
As described above, agile addresses each of these three 
shortcomings. Were it applied in substance as well as in name, the DoD 
would profit from lower prices, timelier delivery, and better products. 
So what is keeping the DoD from doing agile? The next section tries to 
answer that question. 
B. Federal Law or Regulations Do Not Preclude Agile; Instead, 
Culture and Bureaucratic Inertia Impede Change 
After several decades of IT-acquisition reforms one thing is clear. 
The problem is not laws or regulations that favor waterfall or disfavor 
agile. Agile has been an option under the rules for nearly two 
decades.188 Several studies have found that the current set of 
procurement laws and regulations are not incompatible with agile.189 
Though perhaps not tailored as well as they could be, which the next 
section considers, that is not the main problem. 
The main problem, instead, lies with the culture.190 As Lapham 
writes, “Agile culture runs counter to the traditional DoD acquisition 
culture in many ways.”191 This section considers four reasons why the 
DoD culture favors waterfall: a preference for familiar hierarchical 
control, risk aversion, and ignorance of the legal authority permitting 
 
 187. Id. at 40–41. But see infra note 194. 
 188. See supra notes 145–146 and accompanying text. 
 189. LAPHAM, supra note 53, at 42 (saying that while many in the acquisition community 
fear that agile is forbidden, “we do not know of any regulations that expressly preclude or limit 
the use of Agile”); LAPHAM ET AL., supra note 78, at 12–13 (noting that although there is a 
widespread belief that the DoD 5000 series forbid agile “programs that have used Agile in 
software development have found that the DoD 5000 series has great flexibility and does not in 
fact preclude the use of Agile”); Broadus, supra note 184, at 6 (citing “multiple studies” indicating 
that “there are no direct policy or practice issues that would preclude or limit the use of Agile 
methods within the DoD”); NORTHERN ET AL., supra note 53, at 24 (citing Duquette, Bloom, & 
Crawford, Transitioning Agile/Rapid Acquisition initiatives to the Warfighter, The MITRE 
Corporation, Technical Report WN080041 (2008) (unpublished) (citing specific provisions from 
the FAR and explaining how they support agile contracting, specifically §§ 6.3, 16.207, 16.5, 
16.603, 43.2).  
 190. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 42, at 40–42 (describing “cultural 
impediments take precedence over rapid [software] development”); STAFF OF. S. SUBCOMM. ON 
INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND SECURITY & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 113TH CONG., 
REP. ON THE AIR FORCE’S EXPEDITIONARY COMBAT SUPPORT SYSTEM: A CAUTIONARY TALE ON 
THE NEED FOR BUSINESS PROCESS REENGINEERING AND COMPLYING WITH ACQUISITION BEST 
PRACTICES 1–2, 8, 18–20 (Jul. 7, 2014) (attributing the failed development of logistics software 
to “resist[ing] institutional changes necessary for success” and “cultural resistance to change”). 
 191. LAPHAM, supra note 53, at 21. 
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agile methods.192 Before proceeding, it bears mentioning that cultural 
issues are not unique to the military; recognizing the corporate culture 
is increasingly recognized by business scholars as an important part of 
what executives do, and can help them to benefit from and, where 
necessary, change or compensate for that culture.193  
First, maybe senior procurement personnel have resisted agile 
since they grew up with and are comfortable with waterfall.194 After all, 
waterfall was not only preferred in the 1980s, it was required.195 Thus, 
Lapham describes a culture both “heavily invested” in waterfall and 
“skeptical” about agile,196 and attributes this to comfort with the status 
quo.197 It bears mentioning that the DoD is not unique in this respect; 
agile acolytes have long evangelized that it is not enough to do agile, 
but that organizations must develop an agile culture.198 
The tendency to treat software development like any other large 
weapons-systems procurement is a kindred problem. As the National 
Research Council explains, “DOD systems acquisition policies, 
 
 192. These are not the only reasons that the DoD acquisition community prefers the status 
quo and disfavors agile. There are several other reasons. See, e.g., LAPHAM ET AL., supra note 78, 
at 49–51 (listing six common complaints about agile methods among DoD contracting 
professionals including that it is new, risky, and difficult to adopt); LAPHAM, supra note 53, at 18–
22 (identifying the DoD’s general cultural resistance to agile methods). And in addition to cultural 
resistance to agile, the workforce has several other shortcomings. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, supra note 42, at 42–43 (listing several such problems, including “personnel practices 
that are common in the acquisition community” such as “rotating personnel too often” for program 
managers to see a project through to completion). 
 193. See Learning the Lingo, ECONOMIST, Jan. 11, 2014, at 72–73 (reviewing a new book 
on the subject, JOHN CHILDRESS, LEVERAGE: THE CEO’S GUIDE CORPORATE CULTURE (2013)); 
Crossing the Divide, ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 2013, at 99–100 (reviewing a book on how national 
cultures affect corporate cultures, KAI HAMMERICH & RICHARD LEWIS, FISH CAN’T SEE WATER, 
HOW NATIONAL CULTURES CAN MAKE OR BREAK YOUR CORPORATE STRATEGY (2013)). 
 194. LAPHAM, supra note 53, at 14. Lapham also explains that DoD acquisition personnel 
are not alone in this regard. She writes, “long-time DoD contractors” are likewise “more 
comfortable with Waterfall and skeptical about using Agile.” LAPHAM ET AL., supra note 78, at 
12.  
 195. See supra note 134. 
 196. LAPHAM ET AL., supra note 78, at 43. 
 197. Id. (writing that “culture of the DoD acquisition community . . . is comfortable with 
Waterfall and skeptical about the use of Agile”) (emphasis added). 
 198. See, e.g., LAPHAM, supra note 53, at 1–2, 13–15 (describing the so-called “Agile 
Manifesto” and the challenges of not just “doing” agile but also “being” agile, i.e., developing an 
agile culture); LAPHAM ET AL., supra note 78, at 43 (relating that a frequent topics at the 2009 
Agile Development Practices Conference was culture and that the that agile “d[oes] not succeed 
if an organization’s culture d[oes] not support it”); LARMAN, supra note 69, at 34 (describing the 
importance of a firm’s culture to the agile method); LEFFINGWELL, SCALING SOFTWARE AGILITY, 
supra note 69, at 92 (describing corporate culture as a fundamental impediment to agile methods); 
LEFFINGWELL, AGILE SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS, supra note 66, at 391 (describing agile culture 
as a fundamental principle of the agile method). 
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expertise, practice, and culture—including those applied to IT 
systems—reflect the practices, policies, and cultural norms associated 
with large weapons systems programs.”199 The problem is those 
methods are incongruous with challenges unique to software; software 
development is not major weapons acquisitions. Continuing, the 
National Research Council explains, “there is a long-standing 
reluctance to deviate from standard weapons system acquisition 
processes, and acquisition personnel are not trained or led to 
differentiate the unique aspects of IT systems acquisition.”200 So DoD 
procurement personnel resist treating software differently from what 
they know best: the sequential methods used for other acquisitions.201 
Second, to restate an obvious point mentioned above, the DoD is 
by its very nature a hierarchical organization.202 So too is its acquisition 
culture.203 Thus, agile methods clash with that culture, the former being 
bottom-up and latter top-down. And it would thus seem that DoD 
personnel may prefer the sense of control that waterfall confers: plans 
are made from on high, the design follows strict requirements, and 
delivery is to conform with the plan.204 
Third, caution also plays a role. Project managers are used to 
“following [a] plan with minimal change,” whereas agile “focuses on 
adapting successfully to inevitable changes.”205 It isn’t only that 
waterfall is more familiar, but also that waterfall is considered safer—
a stable option with fewer risks is alluring. As the incumbent, it may 
seem “safe” or “conservative,” but this is illusory. In fact, choosing 
waterfall is a “dangerous decision that can drastically increase 
programmatic risk” and too often results in “total project failure.”206 
Yet this is often lost on the putatively risk averse. 
 
 199. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 42, at 4 (emphasis added). 
 200. Id. at 33. 
 201. LAPHAM, supra note 53, at 14 (recounting DoD’s “longstanding reluctance to deviate 
from standard weapons system acquisition processes,” which generally use waterfall). 
 202. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 203. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 42, at 40–41 (explaining that the DoD 
prefers waterfall’s hierarchical structure); DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 25, at 
37–38 (describing “log jams” and bureaucratic processes whereby myriad functional 
organizations can slow down or even stop programs that do not satisfy their concerns). 
 204. That is not to say there are not reasons for its hierarchical culture. “Given the criticality 
and danger of its mission, its worldwide operations and large workforce, and the frequent need 
for clear, decisive action, the Department of Defense, by its nature, is an organization with a 
classic command-and-control culture.” NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 42, at 40. 
 205. Id. at 40–41; see also Broadus, supra note 184, at 9 (contrasting traditional DoD culture 
where “the focus is on following the plan with minimal change” with agile procurement where 
“the focus is on adapting successfully to inevitable change”). 
 206. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 47. 
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Finally, ignorance of what the procurement laws and regulations 
allow, though not purely a cultural issue, has discouraged the use of 
agile. Although statutes and regulations have allowed iterative methods 
for nearly two decades, this confusion still exists.207 Lapham cites a 
“widespread perception” that agile conflicts with DFARS 5000.01 and 
5000.02,208 when that is not the case.209 DoD contractors share this 
confusion.210 Thus, ignorance remains a problem. 
Because the problem is mainly cultural, tweaking the regulations 
is not the solution; the people matter far more than the policy. Agile 
reforms will not work until the culture changes. Procurement 
professionals must know their options, must understand what agile is, 
and must be committed to applying it. This is mainly a function of 
better training, which may include better centralized training211 or 
“embedded” agile experts to assist with training.212 Lapham suggests 
that in order to change the culture, agile reforms should be gradual.213 
Whatever the solution, the important thing is that people are the 
answer: procurement personnel making decisions and implementing 
policy on a daily basis will make or break agile reforms. Better 
regulations, no matter how well-worded, cannot do that. 
C. To the Extent That Federal Procurement Law and 
Regulations Are To Blame, There Are Several Reforms 
That May Help 
“[I]t is tempting,” Abraham Maslow quipped, “if the only tool you 
have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail.”214 Lawyers 
are susceptible to the same sort of category error, but laws are our 
hammers. We rarely see a problem that cannot be solved with a new or 
improved law or regulation. 
Yet the reluctance to embrace agile is not mainly a legal problem. 
As described in the previous section, other forces are at work—such as 
 
 207. See supra notes 145–146 and accompanying text. 
 208. LAPHAM ET AL., supra note 78, at 49. 
 209. See supra note 189.  
 210. LAPHAM ET AL., supra note 78, at 11. 
 211. See, e.g., Benjamin J. Balter, Toward a More Agile Government: The Case for 
Rebooting Federal IT Procurement, 41 PUB. CONT. L.J. 149, 168–69 (2011) (recommending 
additional training for contracting officers and other procurement professionals); NATIONAL 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 42, at 40–41 (lamenting that the Defense Acquisition University 
lacks “a comprehensive program to teach IT program management or IT test and evaluation”). 
 212. LAPHAM ET AL., supra note 78, at 21. 
 213. Id. at 43 (describing a process for developing an agile acquisitions culture in the DoD). 
 214. ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE: A RECONNAISSANCE (1966). 
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culture, training, and inertia—and are much more important. 
Nevertheless certain legal or regulatory reforms may help to a degree, 
and we turn to those now. 
In a passage in his book on the French Revolution, British 
philosopher and MP Edmund Burke contrasts easy and hard reforms. 
Easy reforms, he argues, can be made by mobs just well as by 
parliaments.215 He continues: 
The shallowest undertaking the rudest hand is more than equal to 
that task. Rage and [f]renzy will pull down more in half an hour, 
than prudence deliberation and foresight can build up in an hundred 
years. The errors and defects of old establishments are visible and 
palpable. It calls for little ability to point them out. . . . To make 
every thing the reverse of what they have been is quite as easy as to 
destroy.216  
This he contrasts with true progress, which is much harder won: “At 
once to preserve and to reform is quite another thing.”217  
This passage reminds us of the law of unintended consequences 
and that reforms should be made deliberately; reform and progress are 
not the same. We should be mindful not only that acquisition has 
undergone much reform in the past 50 years (and not all for the 
better)218 and of the defects with cyber procurement, but also that there 
is much that is right about our system; some maintain the United States’ 
acquisition system is the “envy of the world.”219 Notwithstanding what 
seem like serious defects with software procurement catalogued above 
 
 215. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 247 (2d ed. 1790). 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. He elaborates: 
When the useful parts of an old establishment are kept, and what is superadded is 
to be fitted to what is retained, a vigorous mind, steady persevering attention, 
various powers of comparison and combination, and the resources of an 
understanding fruitful in expedients are to be exercised; they are to be exercised in 
continued conflict with the combined force of opposite vices; with the obstinacy 
that rejects all improvement, and the levity that is fatigued and disgusted with 
everything of which it is in possession. 
Id. at 247–48. 
 218. The Department of Defense at High Risk: The Recommendations of the Chief 
Management Officer on Acquisition Reform and Related High Risk Areas, Report by the H. Comm. 
on Armed Services, 111th Cong. 111–52 (2009) (describing 130 studies on acquisition processes 
since World War II and a near constant state of change to statute and regulations). 
 219. See, e.g., Politicizing Procurement: Will President Obama’s Proposal Curb Free 
Speech and Hurt Small Business?, Joint Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Business and H. 
Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 112th Cong. (May 12, 2011) (testimony of Daniel 
I. Gordon, Office of Management and Budget Office of Federal Procurement Policy, stating that 
the United States’ acquisition system is the “envy of the world”). 
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and a promising solution, any reforms should be made with due care. 
Thus, this paper returns to Burke’s notion of genuine progress and the 
tradeoffs that come with the procurement reforms in the closing 
section. 
Having made an extended disclaimer about hasty or careless 
reforms, three suggestions seem appropriate. First, we should consider 
a new process for IT that works outside the FAR. Second, we ought to 
consider eliminating or amending regulations that are inconsistent with 
agile. Third, Congress ought to reduce scrutiny over IT to facilitate 
agile development. 
The FAR spans over 2,000 pages.220 Some argue this complexity 
entails excessive transaction costs,221 discourages the best in the private 
sector from competing,222 and—most importantly here—is 
incompatible with agile.223 Not all federal contracting dollars flow 
through the FAR,224 so one option would be to carve out an exception 
for IT acquisitions.225 Cooperative research and development 
agreements,226 or the DoD’s authority to enter into what are called 
“other transactions” for certain research projects,227 may serve as 
models. Adapting the FAR and the myriad sub-regulations and culture 
implementing it may be impossible. Notwithstanding the lengthy 
Burke quote, good authority from an even older source holds that 
sometimes it is preferable to pour new wine into new bottles, else the 
 
 220. While this page count is considerable, it still pales in comparison to the Internal 
Revenue Service code, which doubled in size from 2003 to 2011, reaching 3.8 million words or 
73,954 pages. Companies and the State, ECONOMIST (SPECIAL REPORT), Feb. 22, 2014, at 14 
(giving word count and describing the influence of corporate lobbies on the growth in the IRS 
regulations); WOLTERS KLUWER, FEDERAL TAX LAW KEEPS ADDING UP (2013), 
http://www.cch.com/TaxLawPileUp.pdf (giving page count for the 2013 CCH STANDARD 
FEDERAL TAX REPORTER). 
 221. See Challenges to Doing Business with the Department of Defense: Findings of the 
Panel on Business Challenges in the Defense Industry, H. Comm. on Armed Services 112th Cong. 
(Mar. 19, 2012) (describing the high cost associated with contracting or otherwise doing business 
with the federal government, prepared by the Congressional Research Service, et al.). 
 222. See, e.g., Johnson & Reed, supra note 47.  
 223. See Balter, supra note 211, at 165–66 (arguing a preference for competition over 
quality, long lead times, and stable requirements make the current system incompatible with 
agile). 
 224. CIBINIC ET AL., supra note 118, at 14–25 (explaining that the government engages a 
variety of non-FAR contractual arrangements).  
 225. DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 25, at 35–36 (quoting Secretary Gates’s 
article, supra note 45, recommending that exceptions be carved out for warfighters’ critical 
needs). 
 226. 15 U.S.C. § 3710a (2013) (authorizing directors of federal laboratories to enter 
CRADAs). 
 227. 10 U.S.C. § 2371(a) (2013) (granting DoD this authority for prototyping projects). 
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new wine burst the old bottles.228 That is, it may be time to write a new 
IT-acquisition regulation uncontaminated by its predecessor. 
If carving out an exception for IT proves untenable, we ought to 
consider revising acquisition laws and regulations to make them more 
compatible with agile. To take but one example, Lapham notes that a 
“particular sticking point” is that the DoD 5000 series regulations 
require large capstone events such as Critical Design Review.229 
Although there are workarounds, ideally regulations would be written 
without any lingering bias toward waterfall.230 And this is not the only 
conflict between the regulations and agile methods.231 If the DoD is to 
adopt agile, its regulations ought to be consistent with that aim. 
Third, Congress ought to consider limiting its strict oversight of 
DoD IT acquisitions.232 This would runs contrary to recent practice 
because starting in 2007 Congress increased oversight to 
“unprecedented levels.”233 This includes annual reports to Congress 
containing schedules with milestones, implementation schedules, life-
cycles cost estimates, and key performance parameters summaries,234 
 
 228. See Matthew 9:14–17 (King James). 
 229. LAPHAM ET AL., supra note 78, at 11; see also DoDI 5000.02, Enclosure 2, ¶ 6.c.(6) 
(mandating critical design reviews and several other capstone events). 
 230. Id. at 13 (explaining that experienced contractors have accommodated the government 
and compromised with interim design reviews, which are more compatible with agile). 
 231. Id. at 12 (describing metrics and “granularity of estimates and task detail” requirements 
that are a poor fit for agile); LAPHAM, supra note 53, at 3 (explaining at the FAR and other 
acquisition regulations are cumbersome because they were written during the Cold War when the 
nation was not engaged in “dynamic warfighting” as it is today). Lapham. shared an anecdote that 
captures how just much red tape can encumber software development: 
If the government got a requirement to take a simple Hypertext PreProcessor 
(PHP)/mySQL-based forum type website that already exists in the .com and simply 
move it to the .mil, it could take $3–5 million and a year to complete. This would 
include, but not be limited to, documenting a new start, conducting a capabilities 
assessment, assigning a program manager, finding a host, doing the justification 
and approval, establishing contracts, getting the vendor and “approved” system for 
billing, briefing the required oversight groups, and so forth. If this type of 
requirement occurred within a commercial environment, it would take about two 
hours and less than $1,000. 
Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
 232. Congress has imposed a number of “legislative impediments” to agile reforms. For 
example, “the total dollar thresholds for designating oversight levels for IT programs are 
significantly lower than those used for weapons systems (by a factor of five). This results in a 
dichotomy in which an IT system with a development and deployment cost of $126 million over 
its life cycle has highly centralized oversight, while a weapons system counterpart at the same 
dollar level can be decentralized at the program executive officer level.” See NATIONAL 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 42, at 44 (citation omitted). 
 233. DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 25, at 45–46. 
 234. Id. at 45; 10 U.S.C. § 2445C (2013) (requiring reports listed above commencing 
January 1, 2008). 
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as well as “Nunn-McCurdy-like reporting,”235 whereby IT programs 
are judged using a baseline and “[a]ny change in cost, schedule, or 
performance that exceed[s] predefined limits will be associated with a 
significant or critical change” and “trigger[s] a report to Congress.”236 
Such rigid reporting requirements resemble waterfall, trickle down to 
individual contracts, and make nominally agile efforts function like 
pseudo-waterfall. This is counterproductive, and comes at the same 
time Congress is demanding greater use of agile.237 It is as if Congress 
were hitting the gas and slamming on the brakes at the same time. If it 
is serious about wanting agile to succeed, it must cut the red tape.238 
 
 235. This refers to the Nunn–McCurdy Amendment to the National Defense Authorization 
Act of 1983, which requires special reporting to Congress if a weapon system’s cost per unit 
exceeds 15% of the original estimate and the cancelation if it exceeds 25%. See MOSHE 
SCHWARTZ, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, R41293, THE NUNN-MCCURDY ACT: 
BACKGROUND, ANALYSIS, AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1–2 (2010); 10 U.S.C. § 2433 (2013) 
(codifying the Nunn–McCurdy Act). 
 236. DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 25, at 45–46 (describing several other 
reporting and oversight requirements under 10 U.S.C. § 2445C). 
 237. See NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–84, § 804, 123 Stat. 2190, 2402–03 
(2009) (mandating agile for IT acquisitions). 
 238. This is, of course, an oversimplification. Detailing a cooperative relationship between 
the executive and legislative branches could be a paper unto itself. So this footnote attempts only 
to sketch what such a relationship might look like. It proceeds in three parts: first, it describes the 
constitutional oversight duties and powers; second, it notes the inherent tension between oversight 
and managerial flexibility; third, it offers some thoughts about squaring this circle. 
Congress has a constitutional duty of oversight. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 
187 (1957) (explaining that the investigative power “is inherent in the legislative process”); 
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959) (holding that “the scope of the power of 
inquiry, in short, is as penetrating as the potential power to enact and appropriate under the 
Constitution”). Congress has several tools at its disposal, including powers to subpoena, hold 
hearings, depose, grant immunity, hold in contempt, and bring suit. See MORTON ROSENBERG, 
INVESTIGATIVE OVERSIGHT: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF 
CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY 7–15 (2003); MARTIN O. JAMES, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 32–37 
(2002); JAMES HAMILTON, THE POWER TO PROBE: A STUDY OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 
56–100 (1976). Contra LANCE COLE & STANLEY M. BRAND, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 
AND OVERSIGHT: CASE STUDIES AND ANALYSIS 80–82 (2011) (recounting Supreme Court’s 
limitations on congressional investigations following the “excesses” of the 1950s). This duty is 
heightened for defense expenditures for two reasons. First, the military constitutes the largest 
category of discretionary spending, and thus implicates Congress’s duty to oversee the money it 
spends. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (providing “[n]o money shall be drawn from the Treasury” 
except by appropriations bills, establishing the power of the purse); Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 111 
(linking the breadth and depth of oversight powers to Congress’s appropriation authority). Second, 
in addition to the power of the purse, the Constitution grants Congress an important role in the 
exercise of military powers. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress power to “declare 
war,” “raise and support armies,” “provide and maintain a Navy,” “make Rules for the 
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,” mobilize state militias, and “provide 
for organizing, arming, and disciplining” those state militias). This was by design. Having granted 
greater military powers to the federal government than existed under the Articles of 
Confederation, the framers “split these powers between the legislature and the executive” to 
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Though it may be counterintuitive, granting the DoD more flexibility 
to apply agile methods may well produce better results than would 
more waterfall-type scrutiny from Congress. 
CONCLUSION 
Returning to where this paper started, the DoD desperately needs 
to do IT acquisition faster in order to do its job. Yet it has been slow to 
 
ensure that these powers were not abused. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: 
A BIOGRAPHY 114–19 (2005). Foremost among these safeguards was that military appropriations 
would last for no more than two years, and that Congress was thereby to keep a watchful eye on 
the danger to liberty that standing armies pose. See generally THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, 
Vol. 3, 122–66 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (assembling the framers’ writings 
on the dangers of standing army and the protections afforded by Art. 1, § 8, cl. 11). In short, 
Congress must oversee military expenditures both because they are costly and because they are 
martial—both of which implicate important congressional roles under the Constitution. Such 
long-standing roles should not be taken lightly merely to expedite software development. 
Yet congressional oversight is not free. See JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: 
THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 212–13 (1990) (describing the cost-benefit 
tradeoff that comes with any system of oversight); Kathleen Bawn, Choosing Strategies to Control 
the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and the Committee System, 13 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 101, 105–06 (1997) (arguing for the optimal amount of congressional oversight in terms of 
political costs and benefits). Perhaps oversight should be balanced against “managerial 
flexibility.” See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-117SP, PERFORMANCE 
BUDGETING: EFFORTS TO RESTRUCTURE BUDGETS TO BETTER ALIGN RESOURCES WITH 
PERFORMANCE 4–8, 13–14 (2005) (recognizing the tradeoffs between “managerial flexibility” and 
“congressional control”). Congress should never forsake its constitutionally mandated oversight 
duties, but it should nevertheless exercise prudence—lest micromanagement come at the expense 
of the flexibility necessary to the proper functioning of the executive agencies—in its exercise of 
those duties. “One basic issue cuts across most of the problems,” Bernard Rosen explains, is “how 
to allow maximum possible independence while assuring adequate accountability.” BERNARD 
ROSEN, HOLDING GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACIES ACCOUNTABLE 54–56 (3rd ed. 1998). 
It seems any viable executive-legislative relationship would exhibit at least three features. 
First, government personnel—whether employees or contractors—ought to be given “the legal, 
fiscal, and political independence” in order “to gain freedom from hierarchical control . . . in such 
matters as setting intermediate goals, establishing and applying standards,” etc. ROSEN, supra, at 
54 (summarizing Harvey Mansfield, Independence and Accountability for Federal Contractors 
and Grantees, in THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY (Bruce L.R. Smith ed., 1975)). That would mean 
less congressional scrutiny of milestones and the like, which are the bane of agile. Second, perhaps 
Congress ought to focus more on policy and less on management. Consultant Peter Drucker long 
counseled that elected officials are incapable of effective management, and ought to focus instead 
on policy. See PETER DRUCKER, THE AGE OF DISCONTINUITY 219–20 (1969). Following Drucker, 
perhaps Congress ought to operate at a strategic level and leave day-to-day tactical decisions to 
agency managers. Third, Congress would do well to constrain its oversight activities in order 
maximize their efficacy because a recent study suggests that less is more. Counterintuitively, 
increasing the number of committees “monitoring and potentially directing agency 
policymaking,” lessens its influence and “undercut[s] the ability of Congress to respond 
collectively to the actions of the presidency or the bureaucracy.” See Joshua D. Clinton, David E. 
Lewis & Jennifer L. Selin, Influencing the Bureaucracy: The Irony of Congressional Oversight, 
57 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 1, 2 (2013). Of course, much more could be written, but hopefully this 
provides a basic outline of how a healthy executive-legislative relationship might work. 
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adopt the agile reforms that have swept across the private industry. The 
previous section reviewed some regulatory obstacles, but none of those 
preclude agile.239 Instead, the problem is that although laws and 
regulations use the jargon, “agile” acquisition is a misnomer as the DoD 
is stuck in the past, using methods discredited decades ago.  There are 
regulatory obstacles, but the problem is mainly cultural. 
Returning to Burke,240 reforms can be harmful and progress does 
not come easily. We ought to take care before too hastily changing to a 
system that, all things considered, works fairly well—with the notable 
exception of cyber procurement. We should be wary of the inevitable 
tradeoffs.241 Transparency is first among these. With agile we lose the 
top-down controls waterfall afforded, and may thereby lose some 
transparency. Yet that loss is not without recompense, and we may gain 
more than we lose.  
Some argue that far from diminishing transparency, agile 
increases it. That is, while waterfall gives the false impression of 
transparency, agile delivers the real thing. Waterfall measures success 
against a standard established before development started; agile 
updates those standards in real-time, as end users provide feedback on 
each new iteration. Genuine transparency, the argument goes, is what 
makes agile both painful to adopt and worthwhile.242  
Burke would counsel that when it comes to reforms, like 
Hippocrates, our watchword ought to be “first, do no harm.” Yet even 
if agile resulted in lost transparency, it may still be worth the price. 
After all, a pristine system is not free; we pay not only in terms of 
formal controls, but also opportunity cost. At some point, surely value 
outweighs transparency. As described above,243 the DoD has reached 
that point. It pays far too much for software that takes too long to 
develop and under-delivers. The time has come for agile reform.244 
 
 239. See supra note 189 (citing several studies indicating that federal procurement law and 
regulations do not preclude agile software development). 
 240. See supra notes 215–217 and accompanying text. 
 241. See generally Steven L. Schooner, Desiderata: Objectives For a System of Government 
Contract Law, 2 PUB. PROC. L. REV. 103, 103–09 (2002) (describing tradeoffs in public 
procurement policy among principles of competition, integrity, transparency, efficiency, customer 
satisfaction, best value, wealth distribution, risk avoidance, and uniformity). 
 242. I am indebted to Mr. Mark Schwartz, Chief Information Officer at United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), who read an earlier version of this paper, for this 
insight. 
 243. See Sections II.B and II.C, supra. 
 244. If, as suggested above, supra note 242, and accompanying text, transparency isn’t lost 
in the bargain, so much the better. It might be that agile increases genuine transparency. If so, agile 
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Whatever its effect on transparency, agile is an idea whose time 
has come. The DoD and Congress should dispense with rhetoric and 
develop a culture and regulatory framework consistent with the agile 
methods. That will not be easy. 
Another challenge is the tension between agile and 
cybersecurity.245 This paper has dwelt primarily on the need for timelier 
solutions to the DoD’s needs because an acquisition cycle fast enough 
to keep up with the technology’s rapid growth is essential to meeting 
those needs. But speed is not everything. Sometimes secure systems 
may come at the expense of speed, cost, or quality; a system that is late, 
costly, or ineffective may be preferable to one that is unsecure. 
Harnessing agile’s advantages while also recognizing and 
compensating for its disadvantages will not be easy.246 
Genuine agile reforms may not be easy, but they are urgent. 
Returning to the dangers catalogued at the outset,247 cyber warfare 
presents the DoD with unprecedented challenges—especially given 
 
software development would not only be cheaper, faster, and of better quality, it might also 
increase, not decrease, the integrity of our procurement system. 
 245. The tension between any agile methods or any form of rapid development methods and 
developing secure systems is well documented. See, e.g., Steffen Bartsch, Practitioners’ 
Perspectives on Security in Agile Development, Sixth International Conference on Availability, 
Reliability and Security, IEEE CONF. PUB. 479–84 (2011) (summarizing several studies on the 
tension between agile and cybersecurity).  
 246. Some argue that agile can be adapted to security or that they are not mutually exclusive. 
See, e.g., SIMON BROWN, SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE FOR DEVELOPERS (2013) (arguing there is 
no conflict between agile and architecture); Stephany Bellomo & Carol Woody, DOD 
INFORMATION ASSURANCE AND AGILE: CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS GATHERED 
THROUGH INTERVIEWS WITH AGILE PROGRAM MANAGERS AND DOD ACCREDITATION 
REVIEWERS 1–2, 15 (2012) (suggesting agile is a net benefit to security as “shorter iterations make 
problems visible sooner so problems can be fixed earlier”); Deborah L. Farroha & Bassam S. 
Farroha, Agile Development for System of Systems: Cyber Security Integration into Information 
Repositories Architecture, 2011 Systems Conference IEEE CONF. PUB. (2011) (advocating a 
systems architecture that both utilizes agile methods and ensures security); Nancy R. Mead, et al., 
Venkatesh Viswanathan & Deepa Padmanabhan, Incorporating Security Requirements 
Engineering into the Dynamic Systems Development Method, Annual IEEE International 
Computer Software and Applications Conference, IEEE CONF. PUB. 949–54 (2011) (attempting 
to reconcile agile with security); Hossein Keramati & Seyed-Hassan Mirian-Hosseinabadi, 
Integrating Software Development Security Activities with Agile Methodologies, IEEE/ACS 
International Conference on Computer Systems and Applications IEEE CONF. PUB. 749–54 
(2008) (attempting to reconcile agile and security); Mikko Siponen, et al., Integrating Security 
into Agile Development Methods, Proceedings of the 38th Hawaii International Conference on 
System Sciences, IEEE CONF. PUB. 1–7 (2005) (acknowledging conflict between secure and agile 
software development and suggesting how to harmonize the two); Konstantin Beznosov & 
Philippe Kruchten, Towards Agile Security Assurance, in NSPW ‘04: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2004 
NEW SECURITY PARADIGMS WORKSHOP 47–54 (ACM 2004) (identifying four security assurance 
methods, arguing that two of them clash with agile, and suggesting “ways of alleviating the 
conflict”). 
 247. See supra Sections II.A and II.B. 
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that 90% of its weapons systems’ functionality depends on software.248 
And the DoD lacks the tools to defend itself or to fight in the cyber 
domain because its IT-acquisition process is far too slow to keep pace 
with technological growth.249 Fortunately, the arsenal of democracy250 
has provided a solution in the form of the agile software-development 
method. It’s time for DoD IT acquisitions to do and to be agile, and not 
just rhetorically. 
 
 248. See supra note 25. 
 249. See supra Section II.C. 
 250. See supra note 3. 
